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AGAAT’S LAW: REFLECTIONS ON LAW AND
LITERATURE WITH REFERENCE TO MARLENE
VAN NIEKERK’S NOVEL AGAAT
JOHANVAN DERWALT*
Professor of Law, University of Glasgow, Honorary Professor of Law,
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg
Son of man, you cannot say, or guess, for you know only
Aheap of broken images, where the sun beats,
and the dead tree gives no shelter.
T S Eliot The Waste Land
For Irene Grootboom, the big tree that almost gave shelter . . .
I INTRODUCTION
This article is based on a public lecture that I presented at the University of
theWitwatersrand, Johannesburg inAugust 2007. The lecture formed part of
my teaching and research involvement with the Wits Law School as a Bram
Fischer Visiting Scholar during the month of August 2007. The invitation to
become a Bram Fischer Visiting Scholar and to give a public address in
memory of Bram Fischer posed a daunting challenge. How is one to honour
the memory and legacy of Bram Fischer, Bram Fischer the boere communist,
after long reigns of communisms that, instead of vindicating the thinking of
Marx, only served to discredit it; instead of destroying the state, only served
to inﬂate the state and entrench it in every imaginable walk of life; instead of
terminating the law in the name of a classless humanity, only served to
dehumanise the law?
It is clear that this question haunts and perhaps even dominates the last
pages of Stephen Clingman’s biography of Fischer. Having lent credence to
Laurens van der Post’s comments on the ‘unreality of communism’ and the
‘unreality of Fischer’ regarding this unreality of communism, Clingman
imputes a certain moral blindness and lack of understanding to Fischer
regarding the ‘morally compromised ideology’of communism.
‘If the judgment is purely historical — that Bram was wrong because
communism failed — it will be contingent and superﬁcial: change the result
and we would have to change the verdict. A more telling version is the moral
one: Bram’s ﬂaw was that he was swayed by a morally compromised ideology,
and the speciﬁc absolutism it induced produced his particular tragedy. After all,
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moral blindness is one consequence of the classic tragic ﬂaw, and given the
Soviet show trials, the gulag, the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia,
perhaps it captures Bram’s one failing. Or perhaps, with some greater nuance,
Bram’s ﬂaw was one of understanding, in that he did not fully comprehend the
wider resonances and implications — the essential fatalism — involved in his
choices.’1
Alas, there is no nuance here, only complacent moralism. It should be
noted that no argument is offered on any of the preceding or subsequent
pages regarding communism being intrinsically ‘a morally compromised
ideology’ and not just an ideology with an incidentally bad historical record
(that may or may not have improved in times to come). Clingman pulls a
vulgar Fukuyama stunt here that is not in keeping with the rest of his
exquisite narrative of Fischer’s life.2
To be sure, no argument will be offered in what follows regarding the
moral superiority or inferiority of communism. The position taken in this
essay turns on the conviction that debates regarding the normative or moral
superiority of capitalism or communism do not stand a reasonable chance of
ever leading to a decisive conclusion, however strong personal convictions
may be in favour of the one or the other. The problem with this kind of
debate relates to the way the conﬂicting contentions take their respective
points of view literally as if the language they employ somehow captures the
truth or essence of human existence. The aim here is on the contrary to
honour the legacy of Bram Fischer by shifting the focus away from literal
understandings of Marxism, which incidentally indeed went a long way
1 Stephen Clingman Bram Fischer: Afrikaner Revolutionary (1998) 450–1. My copy
of the book has an inscription with good wishes for my birthday in 1998, signed by
André andChrista van derWalt. It is marked thus by a friendship that would in the ten
years since then inform much of the thinking that went into the Bram Fischer lecture
at Wits and into this article. Many other friends and colleagues have contributed to
my thoughts over these years. I trust they will forgiveme for naming here, for the sake
of the speciﬁcity of this essay only, Willie Burger, Emilios Christodoulidis and Lind-
say Farmer. Not only does this essay rely heavily on Burger’s essay ‘Deur ’n spieël in ’n
raaisel: Kennis van die self en die ander in Agaat van Marlene van Niekerk’ (2006) 40
Tydskrif vir Taalonderrig 178. It also relies on numerous insightful discussions with
Burger about Van Niekerk’s work. I read and taught the essay of Martha Nussbaum’s
on which the central argument in this essay turns with Emilios Christodoulidis in the
course Law, Justice and Morality that we co-teach at the University of Glasgow.And
conversations with Lindsay Farmer pointed my attention to his excellent essay
‘Criminal responsibility and the proof of guilt’ in Markus Dubber & Lindsay Farmer
(eds) Modern Histories of Crime and Punishment (2007) 42, the reading of which was
crucial for the thoughts I develop in part IV of this essay. I am also deeply indebted to
Henk Botha, Carrol Clarkson, Peter Fitzpatrick, Wessel le Roux, Stewart Motha,
André van der Walt, Melodie Nöthling Slabbert, Karin van Marle and two anony-
mous referees for critical and encouraging comments on previous drafts of this essay.
Responsibility for all scholarly shortcomings of course remains strictly mine.
2 Cf Francis Fukuyama The End of History and the Last Man (1992) for the quintes-
sential celebration of the conclusive moral victory and superiority of the ideology of
capitalist liberal democracy over socialism.
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towards discrediting themselves in the eyes of the world, even among those
most socialistically inclined. The aim is to shift the focus away from these
literal communisms to that which Jean-Luc Nancy calls literary communism (le
communisme littéraire). This literary communism is not directed at the
construction of ﬁctitious myths about the true society, but at the relentless
disruption and interruption of these myths (le mythe interrrompu).3
By shifting the focus away from the essentialism of the literal, the thoughts
that will be developed here aim to direct attention to the literary as that which
restlessly, relentlessly and irrepressibly explores the evanescent and errant4
3 Jean-Luc Nancy La communauté désoeuvrée 3 ed (1999). See especially the essays
‘LeMythe interrompu’and ‘Le communisme littéraire’.
4 The word ‘errant’ has two meanings, one of which is stressed in this essay
without ignoring or discounting the other. ‘Errant’ is used, ﬁrst, to denote a constant
‘taking leave’, ‘journeying’ or ‘travelling’, thus stressing its link with the Latin iterare
which stems from iter (way or road). Stressing this ‘journeying’ or road-bound (dis)-
orientation of ‘errant’ cannot completely de-link it from ‘way-wardness’ or from
‘being off-target’ and thus from ‘erroneous’ and ‘error’. Prioritising its ‘journeying’
and ‘road-bound’ aspect nevertheless severs ‘errant’ from ‘error’ to the extent that the
latter evokes if not invokes notions of ultimate ‘correctness’ and ‘accuracy’ that must
fall by the way-side of a constant journeying or travelling. If the condition of existence
is that of the wayfarer who is constantly road-bound and therefore always wayward
and off-target, nothing can ever be on-target. Ithaca is no longer an option. This is the
distinction between the Odyssey and the tales of errant knights that would, with Cer-
vantes introduce the modern age and the European novel. Milan Kundera describes
this introduction in incomparable fashion: ‘As God slowly departed from the seat
whence he had directed the universe and its order of values, distinguished good from
evil, and endowed each thing with meaning, Don Quixote set forth from his house
into a world he could no longer recognise. In the absence of the Supreme Judge, the
world suddenly appeared in its fearsome ambiguity; the single divine Truth decom-
posed into myriad relative truths parcelled out by men. Thus was born the Modern
Era, and with it the novel, the image and model of that world . . . To take with
Cervantes, the world as ambiguity, to be obliged to face not a single truth but a welter
of contradictory truths (truths embodied in imaginary selves called characters), to have
as one’s only certainty the wisdom of uncertainty, requires [heroic] courage. What does
Cervantes’great novel mean?Much has beenwritten on the question. Some see in it a
rationalist critique of Don Quixote’s hazy idealism. Others see it as a celebration of
that same idealism. Both interpretations are mistaken because they both seek at the
novel’s core not an inquiry but a moral position. Man desires a world where good and
evil can be clearly distinguished, for he has an innate and irrepressible desire to judge
before he understands. Religions and ideologies are founded on this desire. They can
cope with the novel only by translating its language of relativity and ambiguity into
their own apodictic and dogmatic discourse. They require that someone be right:
Either Anna Karenina is the victim of a narrow-minded tyrant, or Karenin is the
victim of an immoral woman; either K. is an innocent man crushed by an unjust
Court, or the Court represents divine justice and K. is guilty. This ‘‘either-or’’ encap-
sulates an inability to tolerate the essential relativity of things human, an inability to
look squarely at the absence of the Supreme Judge. This inability makes the novel’s
wisdom (the wisdom of uncertainty) hard to accept and understand.’ See Milan Kun-
dera The Art of the Novel (1988) 6–7. The exploration of the relation between law and
literature in this essay turns on the difference between the literary and judgmental
sensibilities that Kundera highlights here, but also staggers it exponentially. Pure
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particularity and singularity of unique lives or life stories without ever
attaining to normative assessments of these lives or stories, normative
assessments that would be nothing more than over-arching myths.5 There is
no moral to the errant stories of the literary. They simply keep on (keeping
on) exploring the errant vicissitudes of human existence. Nancy explains this
irrepressible errancy with reference to the notion of writing or écriture in the
work of Derrida.6
On another occasion one could explore the considerable extent to which
Bram Fischer’s own life story — the story of a member of a racist Afrikaner
elite who as a young man shuddered at the thought of shaking hands with
literature or the purely literary sensibility would surely turn on the sheer errancy of all
things human and pure law would certainly turn on a categorical ‘judgmentalism’ that
would have things be either right or wrong. But errancy also permeates this very
relation between the literary and the legal. The human being, for now at least, cannot
simply choose between the literary and the legal. It is still irreducibly exposed to the
claims of both. And the thoughts that are developed in this essay deviate from much
that represents the ‘law and literature movement’ (the movement that suggests that
law and literature learn from one another) in the way they culminate in an insight that
the human being’s errant existence between the legal and the literary (between the
need for secure ‘truths’ and the libidinal desire for adventurous departures from the
security of ‘truths’) is not always a matter of ediﬁcation, constructive learning or
‘better understanding’. Sometimes it is that, but very often, if not indeed more often
than not, it is itself a matter of destructive errancy. In the ﬁnal analysis, for better or for
worse, the literary, more often than not, does seem to have the last say in the current
state of human affairs, even when this last say (again more often than not) comes to us
all robed-up andwigged, that is, in the legal state of utter self-denial.
5 Nancy, commenting on a passage in which Marx rather romantically exults the
particularity (as opposed to the generality) of work in traditional communities, writes
(La communauté désoeuvrée op cit note 3 at 184, emphasis added): ‘La communauté
signiﬁe ici la particularité socialement exposée, et s’oppose à la généralité socialement
implosée qui est celle du capitalisme. S’il y a eu un événement de la pensée marxi-
enne, et si nous n’en avons pas ﬁni avec lui, il a lieu dans l’ouverture de cette pensée.’
Nancy ultimately ﬁnds the word particularité problematic and replaces it with the
word singularité for purposes of avoiding the slippage between particularity and gen-
erality in the construction of ordering myths and mythological literature. ‘Dans le
mythe, ou dans la littérature mythique, les existences ne sont pas offertes dans leur
singularité: mais les traits de la particularité contribuent au système d’une ‘‘vie exem-
plaire’’ d’ou rien ne se retire, où rien ne demeure en decà d’une limite singulière, où
tout se communiqué, au contraire, et s’impose à l’identiﬁcation.’Nancy thus seeks to
displace the particular which already constitutes an ‘exemplary identity’ beyond the
sheer discursiveness or errancy of singular exposures of identities to one another. This
transformation of ‘the particular’ into generality is an important feature of the law that
haunts Marx’s thought even when he moves to salvage the particular from the gen-
eral, as we shall see from the passage from the Gotha Programme quoted below.
6 Nancy La communauté désoeuvrée op cit note 3 at 178n74, invoking ‘l’inter-
ruption, le suspens et la ‘‘différence’’ du sens dans l’origine même du sens, ou encore
l’être-trace (toujours-déjà tracé) du ‘‘présent vivant’’ dans sa structure la plus proper
(c’est-à-dire jamais structure de propriété) constituent, s’il est besoin de le rapeller, les
traits fondamentaux de ce que. . . . Derrida a pensé sous les noms ‘‘d’écriture’’ ou
‘‘d‘archi-écriture’’.’
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black men but ended up sacriﬁcing his life for their freedom7 — evinces traits
of the sheer errancy that Nancy associates with the literary. In doing so one
would have to take leave of Clingman’s invocations of Bram’s ‘ﬂaws’ and
‘failure of understanding’, but simply contemplate the way his life traversed,
in sublime and ultimately tragic fashion, a selﬂess and indeed self-destructive
exposure to the devastating contradictions of the period of South African
history in which he lived. The constraints of present concerns do not allow
for this exploration here. I shall instead take up the challenge of severing
Bram Fischer’s legacy from the cruel legacies of literal Marxism by relating it
to the concern with the unique, the particular or the singular that Nancy
associates with a literary Marxism.8 This literary Marxist concern with the
unique particular, we shall see, goes to the heart of a critique of law if not a
critical aversion to law that reverberates throughout the work of Marx and
signiﬁcant revisions of Marxism in the course of the twentieth century.
This article explores the relation between law and literature with reference
to Marlene van Niekerk’s novel Agaat. And given the undeniable and
irreducible tension between law and any thinking that can truly be called
Marxist, the literary Marxist exploration of the relation between law and
literature that will be at issue here necessarily remains sceptical of any
insistence on the edifying or mutually beneﬁcial relationship between law
and literature. In a way, the thoughts that will be explored in what follows
resonate in an interesting and perhaps surprising way with Richard Posner’s
insistence that law and literature constitute ‘an unruly team’.9 From a literary
Marxist perspective, the relationship between law and literature is as
destructive as the relation between law and Marxism. The idea that law can
gain constructive normative insights from literature is indeed a shallow and
facile one.10 Posner cannot be faulted on this count. Martha Nussbaum
nevertheless takes a markedly different stance in this regard. She contends
that judges can learn from literature a narrative imagination that prepares
7 Cf Clingman Bram Fischer: Afrikaner Revolutionary op cit note 1 at 51.
8 That the notion of a literary Marxism indeed points to a productive way of
severing the legacy of Marx from the abusive empire of Soviet communism is cor-
roborated by Milan Kundera’s insight that this empire represented the death of the
European novel. Cf Kundera The Art of the Novel op cit note 4 at 14.
9 Richard Posner Law and Literature 2 ed (1998) 326, responding to James Boyd
White &Thomas Grey: ‘White, like Thomas Grey . . . loves literature and knows law
andwants to yoke them; but they can be an unruly team.’
10 It reduces literature to a source of moral insights, or to be more precise, to a
source of moral insights that one likes or ﬁnds useful. As David Gorman (‘Review of
Poetic Justice’ (1997) 21 Philosophy and Literature 98) puts it: ‘Nussbaum fails to per-
suade, here as in her previous work, that her concern with literature is a concern with
something more than drawing a moral lesson from it.’ And the consequence of this
approach to literature is that one has to reduce the whole genre of literary works to
the few items that ﬁt into the framework of one’s moral convictions. Those literary
works that signiﬁcantly challenge these convictions will have to be ignored and
discarded. On this, cf also Posner Law and Literature op cit note 9 at 324–32 from
which pages (at 330) I also drew the reference to Gorman.
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them for the mercy and equity required to do justice to a case.11 The
following passage embodies one of her crucial statements in this regard:
‘I shall develop a general thesis concerning the connection between the
merciful attitude and the literary imagination. . . . The Greco-roman tradition
already made a close connection between equity and narrative. The person
who ‘‘reads’’ a complex case in the manner of the reader of a narrative or the
spectator at a drama is put in contact . . . with two features of the equitable: its
attentiveness to particularity and its capacity for sympathetic understanding.
This means that the spectator or reader, if he or she reads well, is already
prepared for equity and, in turn, for mercy.’12
This article will indeed take Nussbaum’s link between literature and mercy
as its central concern. But to the extent that it will engage with this concern
from a literary Marxist perspective, it will argue for a de-constructive regard
for the deeply destructive relations between mercy and law and literature and
law. An edifying understanding of the relation between law and literature
that ignores or underplays the destructiveness of this relationship is neither
11 She insists that this view of the relation between law, literature and mercy is
fundamentally different from Posner’s. Cf in this regard her contentions regarding
Holmes’, Posner’s and Justice Scalia’s severance of law and mercy in Martha Nuss-
baum ‘Equity and mercy’ in Alan John Simmons et al (eds) Punishment: A Philosophy
and Public Affairs Reader (1994) 172–5, 180–1. Although still critical of Posner’s posi-
tion (associating his economic analyses of human life with the Gradgrind reduction of
life to economics that Dickens portrays in Hard Times), one year later in her book
Poetic Justice — The Literary Imagination and Public Life (1995), she now appears to have
softened her stance toward him (at xii). This softened stance appears to be more
personal than argumentative, for it does not contain an essential correction of her
views in ‘Equity and mercy’ that was and is surely due. Posner’s take on the relation
between law andmercy and law and literature is muchmore nuanced thanNussbaum
makes it. It is simply wrong to assert that Posner espouses a view of law as devoid of
mercy. He makes it abundantly clear that the very idea and practice of law turns on a
‘mixture’ of law and mercy. Cf Posner Law and Literature op cit note 9 at 121. This is
also true of the earlier Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation 1 ed (1988) to
which Nussbaum refers. In this earlier edition (at 109) Posner writes: ‘No society has
ever embraced the legalistic conception in its full rigor, though many lawyers and
judges have given it lip service and nineteenth-century American legal formalism
made it the ofﬁcial legal ideology. Every society softens the rigors of strict legal-
ism. . . . It is false that law is not law unless it banishes every human, mitigating,
discretionary, or ‘‘feminine’’ characteristic. The choice between rule and standard . . .
is a choice within law rather than a choice between law and not-law.’ He makes the
same point in the later edition (at 121), now introducing a distinction between primi-
tive and mature law: ‘Both the extreme of hyper legalism and the opposite of extreme
of a purely discretionary system of justice are found only in primitive societies.
Mature societies mix strict law with discretion. . . . The mixture is not inconsistent
with the idea of law; it is the idea of law.’One need not endorse Posner’s rather bold
distinction between ‘primitive’ and ‘mature’ societies (I would in fact be inclined to
reject it) to see his point that a purely or hyper legalistic system of law would be a
primitive system of law.
12 MarthaNussbaum ‘Equity andmercy’op cit note 11 at 167.
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Marxist nor truly literary.13 And it may well come to serve a notion of mercy
that excuses and underpins the harshest of laws in the same breath that it
excuses something or someone from those laws, as Douglas Hay points out in
an essay to which we return shortly.14 The literary Marxist concern with
mercy is a different one. It is a concern with mercy that seeks to destroy both
the laws of class domination and the non-literary literature that invariably
informs these laws.
It must not be forgotten that it is from the Victorian novel that the law of
criminal procedure may well have received its strongest incentive for the
13 Having noted that the law and the very idea of law accommodates rather than
excludes mercy (see note 11), Posner makes a remarkable point regarding the cause of
the unruliness between mercy and law and literature and law in the 1988 edition of
Law and Literature which is rather unfortunately omitted in the 1998 edition: It is
literature that seeks to establish a divide between law and mercy. It is literature that makes law
the merciless villain for the sake of a good story. As Posner (Law and Literature op cit note 11
at 10) puts it: ‘It is noteworthy that [in the Merchant of Venice] Portia distinguishes
mercy from law rather than regarding it as a part of law; for her as for Shylock, law is
the domain of strict rules, strictly enforced. This is the usual way in which law is
presented in literature, partly because the harsh, legalistic, rule-dominated side of law
is the side that produces surprise, abrupt reversals of fortune, and cruel destinies —
and all these are the stuff of literature.’ This is a crucial point that moves Posner’s
reﬂection on literature in the direction of the sublime insight that Derrida articulates
with reference to Artaud: Pristine theatre is the staging of cruelty for the sake of
soliciting (rendering present instead of representing, to be sure) the once-off, unique and
singular manifestation of existence. Cf the essay ‘Le théâtre de la cruaté’ in Jacques
Derrida L’Écriture et la Différerence (1967) 341. Taking one’s cue from this essay one can
say that it is a ‘cruel’ deconstructive concern if not obsession with the unique and the
singular that also inspires the literary Marxist engagement with the potential of litera-
ture to subvert law for the sake of a forceful mercy. This thought leaves one with the
task to ponder the conundrum of having to be cruel to be merciful with which
Derrida’s whole oeuvre confronts us (hence perhaps also the utilisation of the phrase
‘forceful mercy’ in this essay). Present concerns do not allow for doing this here. But
Nussbaum may well want to interpret the apparent convergence on this count
between the politically and economically conservative Posner and the ‘supposedly’
left-wing. Derrida and literary Marxists as a vindication of her claim (cf Nussbaum
‘Skepticism about practical reason in literature and the law’ (1994) 107 Harvard LR
714) regarding the telltale alliance between the left and the right that results from their
respective deconstructions of normative reason. If so, it would be a vain little victory.
Literary Marxists will continue to regard Posner (the conservative capitalist legal
theorist) as an opponent or enemy (depending on the level of cruelty they manage to
stage/not to stage) and are not embarrassed by the fact that this opponent or enemy
shares with them some of their most inspiring insights. They are simply puzzled by
the idea that the sharing of some insights or convictions renders the non-sharing of
others insigniﬁcant. However, this concession to Nussbaum’s vain little victory (if it is
one) is not at all a concession to the accuracy of her 1994 comparison of ‘deconstruc-
tionist’ and ‘law and economics’ approaches to law and legal theory. Present concerns
do not allow for addressing this here either, but it warrants mentioning that her
reading of Derrida distorts his thinking (also the ‘early’ thinking before the switch in
his thinking which she invokes to cover her against invocations of arguments from his
later works) beyond recognition.
14 Cf note 18 below.
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conﬁdent conviction that it can fathom the mind of the accused. Lisa
Rodensky argues that it is in the narratives of Dickens and especially Eliot
that the narrator begins to adopt an omniscient third person perspective that
knows the mind of the characters through and through. Post-Foucaultian
literary critics like D A Miller and John Bender have pointed out that this
‘cognitive privilege’ of the Victorian and other realist narratives of the late
eighteenth and nineteenth century rendered their characters transparent and
directly accessible and in this way facilitated the culture of surveillance that
informed the new police, penitentiary and other disciplinary institutions of
the time.15 Instead of a merciful sensibility, the Victorian novel provided the
law with an example of an unforgiving judgmentalism. Yeats, praising Balzac
for his consistent disinclination to judge, observed with regard to George
Eliot:
‘Great literature has always been written in a like spirit, and is, indeed, the
Forgiveness of Sin, and when we ﬁnd it becoming the Accusation of Sin, as in
George Eliot, who plucks her Tito in pieces with as much assurance as if he had
been clockwork, literature has begun to change into something else. George
Eliot had a ﬁerceness one hardly ﬁnds but in a woman turned argumentative,
but the habit of mind her ﬁerceness gave its life to was characteristic of her
century.’16
Should one wish to endorse Nussbaum’s contention that literature and a
literary sensibility can inform judges and lawyers with a merciful conscious-
ness, one would clearly have to distinguish between different kinds of
literature. And the question arises as to what exactly informed the ﬁerce
judgmentalism of nineteenth century English literature. Foucault would
stress that that the eighteenth and nineteenth century’s judgmental access to
and surveillance of the soul of the accused and the prisoner was not
concerned with harsh punishment for its own sake, but ultimately with
discipline.And one of the key factors that he highlighted to explain the rise of
this disciplinarian consciousness was the emerging need to protect property
against theft in ways that had never been considered necessary before. His
arguments in this regard thus ultimately turned on a quasi-Marxist linking of
property law and criminal law and, of course, between law and the class
struggle.17 Douglas Hay points out this link by highlighting the role of capital
15 Cf Lisa Rodensky The Crime in Mind (2003) 11. The matter may well be more
complex than Rodensky presents it here. Carrol Clarkson has pointed out to me that
Eliot and Henry James in fact criticised Dickens for focusing too much on the exter-
nal traits of his characters and for not developing their internal words sufﬁciently. But
apart from calling for a closer assessment of Dickens in this regard (cf also my qualiﬁ-
cation infra at note 54) this point seems to conﬁrm rather than contradict Rodensky’s
essential argument regarding theVictorian narrative sensibility.
16 CfRodensky The Crime in Mind op cit note 15 at 136.
17 Cf Michel Foucault ‘Truth and juridical forms’ in Power: Essential Works of Fou-
cault vol III (2002) 68–9. It is well-known that Foucault denies that his analyses of the
dynamics of power are Marxist. For one of many clear statements in this regard cf
Foucault ‘Pouvoir et corps’ in Dits et écrits I. 1954-1975 (2001) 1625–6. However, an
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punishment in these disciplinarian ways of capitalism. In these disciplinarian
ways, even mercy had its allotted role:
‘A ruling class organises its power in the state. The sanction of the state is force,
but it is force that legitimised, however imperfectly, and therefore the state deals
also in ideologies. Loyalties do not grow simply in complex societies: they are
twisted, invoked and often consciously created. Eighteenth-century England
was not a free market of patronage relations. It was a society with a bloody penal
code, an astute ruling class who manipulated it to their advantage, and a people
schooled in the lessons of Justice Terror and Mercy. The benevolence of rich
men to poor, and all the ramiﬁcations of patronage, were upheld by the
sanction of the gallows and the rhetoric of the death sentence.’18
Not only does one need to distinguish between different kinds of
literature, one clearly also needs to distinguish between different kinds of
mercy. Nussbaum does not provide us with these distinctions. We shall take
her point regarding the relation between mercy and literature in what
follows, but we shall also move on to make and pursue these further
distinctions. Again, the mercy at stake in a literary Marxist engagement with
literature turns on a quest for a forceful mercy that does not inform the law in
order to re-instate and reinforce its maintenance of class and property
relations. The mercy at stake in a literary Marxist engagement with literature,
should it materialise, would inspire a deep questioning of these legal
relationships and render them unstable, however modestly so. This is indeed
also the aim of the engagement with the novel Agaat in this essay.
All of the above of course culminates in the suggestion that Agaat is a
Marxist novel. I would indeed like to contend that Agaat constitutes an
instance of Marxist literature, at least from a literary Marxist point of view. I
shall nevertheless not labour the point. From the perspective of law and the
laws of literary criticism in particular, the suggestion that Agaat is a Marxist
novel cannot but remain irreducibly contentious. The notion that Agaat is a
Marxist novel must thus ultimately remain a literary assumption. But a basic
argument can be offered in this regard: To the extent that Agaat invites one,
as I shall contend it does in this essay, to resist the speculative imaginary
consciousness that reduces the unfathomable secrets of others to the transparent
and thus thoroughly knowable mirror images of the self, it also calls one to
resist the merciless, accusatory and disciplining techniques that today still
make a mockery of the normative (private or human rights) discourses that
accompany and often legitimate the speculative capitalism of our time.
argument that so clearly links discipline to the protection of property surely indicates
that his departure from Marxism still allows for a certain allegiance with Marxism.
Perhaps there is an errant or deviating Marxism at stake here that can properly/
improperly be associated with the literary Marxism at issue in this essay, perhaps more
so thanmanymore orthodoxMarxisms and neo-Marxisms.
18 Douglas Hay ‘Property, authority and the criminal law’ in Douglas Hay et al
Albion’s Fatal Tree (1976) 62–3.
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II AGAAT’S SECRET
Juridically speaking, Agaat is the story of a white Afrikaner woman who is
accompanied and cared for on her death bed by a coloured woman who has
been her domestic aid for many years, to put this employment relation in
terms of the rather euphemistic post-apartheid idiom. The woman’s name is
Milla de Wet (born Redlinghuys). The servant is Agaat. Milla suffers from
Charcot’s disease or Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) as it is also known.
The disease destroys the nervous system, progressively causes the complete
paralysis of the body and bodily functions and usually leads to death within
three years of its inception. Agaat is the story of the last phase of Milla’s
paralysis during which she can only move her eyelids and still later only one
eyelid.
Milla discovered Agaat on the 16th of December 1953 hiding like a little
wild animal in the hearth of a dirty and dilapidated dwelling for workers on
her (Milla’s) mother’s farm. She was a ﬁve- or six-year-old girl then (her
parents were no longer sure whether she was born in the winter of 1947 or
1948). Her one arm was badly malformed and the one foot turned towards
the other. The narrative suggests that this malformation of her body was
caused by her father having kicked her mother in the stomach on several
occasions during her pregnancy. When Milla discovered her, Agaat was
already seriously neglected, maltreated and sexually abused. Milla took her to
her home on the farm Grootmoedersdrift where she started caring for her
and also broke through her animal shyness with forbidding and often
unforgiving persistence, so as literally to turn her into a human being again.
She taughtAgaat, who initially responded to her with little more than hissing
sounds, to speak again. She taught her basic toilet and bodily hygiene and
clothed her properly. At ﬁrst Agaat lived like a child in her house, but when
Milla gave birth to a son seven years later (August 1960) after even many
more long years of yearning for a child, she moved Agaat out to a servant’s
room outside the house and indeed started treating her like a servant.
Agaat initially resisted Milla’s training and instruction, but aided by the
Hulpboek vir Boere in Suid-Afrika (Husbandry Manual for South African Farmers)
Agaat’s competence and skills as a servant and farm worker eventually
attained mythic proportions. There was almost nothing she could not do or
deal with. There was no animal disease she could not treat and cure, no
tulpsiek Simmentaler bull which she could not single handedly — remember
her malformed right arm — lead into a head vice so that sweet coffee could
be forced down its throat so as to stop it from dying; no ﬁne and complicated
embroidery stitch she could not manage; no galjoen that she could not catch;
no sudden crisis that she could not handle. Her skills were bewitching and
this adjective is surely not without substance. On more than one occasion the
narrative intimates a witch-like, dark side to Agaat. At least twice Milla
observes, spying on her from afar, how Agaat dances a peculiar and sinister
dance. Aware of this strange other side of Agaat, she also starts wondering
whether one of the big crises that Agaat dealt with so masterfully, the ﬁre in
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the barn on the evening of her son Jakkie’s twenty-ﬁfth birthday celebration,
was not in fact caused and orchestrated by Agaat. And already much earlier
Milla realised that she ‘was afraid of Agaat, more afraid when she was right in
front of her than when she was behind her back’. Be it as it may, it is this
extremely competent but somewhat sinister woman who later cares for the
dying Milla with inﬁnite patience and forbidding persistence; patience and
persistence equal to the patience and persistence with which Milla raised the
little Agaat; patience and persistence that enable Milla to communicate right
to the end with the faint movement of a single eyelid.
Willie Burger’s ﬁne reading of Agaat19 illuminates two interconnected
themes in the narrative. According to Burger the novel can ﬁrst be read as an
exploration of death, death being the absolute difference and opaque
otherness that sets a limit to the apparently transparent self-knowledge of the
living self. This opaque otherness and impenetrable difference can only be
explored by way of mourning. Burger points out how Jakkie, thinking about
the deaths of his parents (Milla and Jak de Wet), realises that mourning (‘’n
stuk treurwerk’) is all that remains to be done.20
The second theme that Burger points out is closely connected to the ﬁrst.
It concerns the many mirrors that ﬁgure in the unfolding of the narrative.
Among them two are of speciﬁc signiﬁcance: the mirror into which Jak de
Wet looks during his ﬁtness exercises and by means of which he sustains the
image of an athletic ‘gentleman farmer’ who is good enough for Milla; and
the mirror in Milla’s bedroom, the only piece of furniture that Agaat did not
remove from her room so as to allow her to look at herself right to the end.
Burger relates this play of mirrors in the novel to Jacques Lacan’s theory of
the mirror phase in the child’s development, in the course of which
individuals begin to recognise themselves as mirror images of other individu-
als around them. Thus the child develops an image-centred or imaginary
self-understanding that can develop into serious psychotic tendencies and
other psychological deviations if the mirror phase is not displaced gradually
by the symbolic order of inter-subjective language. Simplifying somewhat,
one can say that Lacan conceives of psychological health in terms of the
complex structures of a language-constituted self that refuses or resists the
understanding of the self and others in terms of immediately or readily
present images.
The person who is enmeshed in an imaginary self-understanding ulti-
mately also understands other people in terms of mirror images of the self.
The otherness of others thus gets reduced to mirror projections of selves who
are already reduced to images that derive from the premature self-
understandings of children or pre-adult individuals. The imaginary self can
therefore never have real relations with others. The imaginary self’s interac-
tion with others takes place on the basis of an imaginary world that does not
19 Burger ‘Deur ’n spieël in ’n raaisel’op cit note 1 at 178.
20 Ibid at 179.
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allow for real knowledge of either the self or the other. According to Burger,
Agaat is the story (or at least partly the story) of the lives of two people, Jak
and Milla de Wet, for whom the imaginary phases of their personal
development have not been displaced sufﬁciently by the symbolic order of
linguistic discourse.
People like Jak and Milla who are stuck in their imaginary views of
themselves and others usually remain stuck in these imaginary views. And
since these imaginary views are little more than self-projections or little more
than the self’s projections of itself, they remain stuck in their own selves.
They never have an experience of otherness. The only window onto
otherness that can open for them comes with the experience of death, for
death is the opaque and radical difference or otherness of which no image can
be formed, at least not when the self truly begins to experience the limits of
existence in the face of death. Jak’s encounter with death comes too quickly
for him to escape from the imaginary views that constitute his self-
understanding, but Milla has a prolonged and agonising experience of her
impending death. Her painfully slow death and the way it forces her to rely
on a painfully slow and limited medium of communication, the letter-by-
letter spelling of words by the increasingly difﬁcult movement of her eyelids
and later still, of a single eyelid, leads her to the realisation that only the
cumbersome and imperfect medium of language allows the self and the other
to get to know one another as different for one another. And only this
experience of difference or otherness makes it possible to say something to
one another. Milla’s excruciatingly limited eyelid language thus becomes a
metaphor for linguistic discourse that always, even under the most conducive
of circumstances, only allows for slow, difﬁcult and imperfect communica-
tion. Such difﬁcult and imperfect communication is nevertheless real
communication, for it does not rely on images that the self constructs in its
own mind and simply expects the other to see clearly also because the other is
viewed as similar to or even the same as the self. Burger refers one to the
following musing of the already close-to-death Milla:
‘Privately you thought if the new heaven and the new earth were to be an
empty, light place without discord or misunderstanding, then you would in
spite of everything prefer life on Grootmoedersdrift with Agaat to beatitude,
and surrounding you, instead of the heavenly void, the mountains and rivers
and humped hills of the Overberg. And you would between yourselves devise
an adequate language with rugged musical words in which you could argue and
ﬁnd each other. The language of reeds and rushes [‘‘a riet en ruigte taal’’ reads
the text in one of the most unforgivable but also most poetic languages on the
face of the earth]. For, you thought, what would be the joy of ﬁnding each
other without having been lost to one each other.’21
21 Ibid at 189, referring to Van Niekerk Agaat, translation of Michiel Heyns (2006)
555. The Afrikaans text (Agaat (2004) 574–5) reads: ‘Heimlik het jy gedink, as die
nuwe hemel en die nuwe aarde ’n leë ligte plek sou wees sonder wanklank of misver-
stand, dan sou jy ten spyte van alles die lewe metAgaat op Grootmoedersdrift verkies
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Beautiful and close to the errancy of the literary as it is, the passage also
evinces a lapse of the literary where it invokes a ‘ﬁnding’ after ‘having been
lost’. A consistently literary Marxist and Derridean22 emphasis on the
irreducible errancy and mystery of the self precludes notions of intersubjec-
tive ﬁnding that suspend and terminate, albeit only temporarily or provision-
ally, the mystery or otherness of the other. On this count the closest to
ﬁnding the other that one ever gets, consists in the deeply curious, amazing
and invariably perplexing experience of the other’s unfathomable difference.
Derrida often criticised Lacan for sometimes invoking an authentic language
that reveals the true self.23 The literary Marxist position developed in this
essay surely does not endorse this element in Lacan’s thinking. Its endorse-
ment of the distinction between the imaginary and the symbolic in Lacan is
not an endorsement of a distinction between ‘lost’ and ‘found’. It is an
endorsement of an ethics of living hospitably with the irreducible and
interminable secret of the self and the other, an ethics of resisting as far as is
humanly possible the very human temptation and inclination to reduce the
self and the other to facile images.24
When one draws together both themes highlighted in Burger’s reading of
Agaat the connection between them becomes evident. The process of
maturing through which the infantile and facile mirror imagery of the infant
(infans — literally those who cannot speak yet) gets displaced by the
complexity and difﬁculty of linguistic understanding and communication, is
inextricably linked to the process of dying through which the self increas-
ingly experiences the unimaginable otherness of death. This deepening
encounter with the unimaginable otherness of death unlocks the self. It thus
allows for and conditions the experience of the differences between selves
and others. The experience of death and mortality conditions the experience
of the irreducible otherness of the other, the irreducible secret of the other
that renders all mortal language and all non-imaginary and non-fantasy
novels apocryphal. Considered from the space articulated by such language
and such narratives, there is an inseparable connection between the experi-
ence of mortality and the sharing of real human relations, that is, human
relations that are not based on false images of one another. But these real
human relationships are subject to the paradox of not really being relation-
het bo die saligheid, met rondom julle, in plaas van die hemelse leegte, die berge en
riviere en die heuwelrûe van die Overberg. En julle sou onder mekaar ’n genoegsame
taal uitwerk met geharde musikale woorde waarin julle kon argumenteer en mekaar
kon vind. Riet- en ruigtetaal. Want, het jy gedink, wat sal die geluk wees van mekaar
vind sonder dat julle vir mekaar verlore was?’
22 Cf note 6 supra.
23 Cf in this regard the poignant comments of Gayatri Spivak in her ‘Translator’s
preface’ to Derrida Of Grammatology JohnHopkins Paperbacks ed (1976) lxiv-lxvii.
24 I am indebted to Carrol Clarkson, André van der Walt and Stewart Motha for
pointing out (in response to an earlier draft of this essay) the risk of a psychologically
or epistemologically still too optimistic reading of/moment in Agaat in this regard. Cf
also note 82 infra.
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ships. They are real encounters with the secret of the other that prevents a
relationship with that other. They are relationships without relation, as
Levinas puts it — ‘relation sans relation’.25
Agaat’s secret? We are not there yet and will never get there. A real reading
of Agaat can at most bring us closer to an experience of her secret, never to
the revelation of the secret itself. The secret is no secret if it does not remain a
secret. For the real reader Agaat will remain ‘an upheaval that has no name’.
But we might stay in touch with this nameless upheaval from afar by working
through the inﬁnite apocryphal falsiﬁcations that it renders possible, however
ﬁnite this working through will always remain. We shall attempt to work
through one of these falsiﬁcations towards the end of this essay. But it is
exactly to the extent that Agaat safeguards Agaat’s secret — her unique
singularity that is not comparable to anything else and therefore not
knowable — that it can be read as a Marxist novel, or at least a literary Marxist
novel. Section II endeavours to make this point, which is central to this essay,
clearer.
III THE LITERARY MARXIST CONCERN WITH THE UNIQUE
AND THE SINGULAR
Law, wrote Marx in his Critique of the Gotha Programme of 1875,
‘can by its nature only consist in the application of an equal standard, but
unequal individuals (and they would not be different individuals if they were
not unequal) can only be measured by the same standard if they are looked at
from the same aspect, if they are grasped from one particular side, eg, if they are
regarded as workers and nothing else is seen in them, everything else is
ignored’.26
This thought, indeed this critique of the law and the language of rights,
goes to the heart of Marx’s critique of exchange value and would reverberate
in all the critical revisions of Marxist thinking in the course of the twentieth
century, through George Lukács’ critique of reiﬁcation,27 right up to
Adorno’s critique of the logic of identity that underlies instrumental
rationality.
25 Cf Emmanuel Lévinas Totalité et Infinie (1971) 69–80.
26 Karl Marx Critique of the Gotha Programme in Marx/Engels Collected Works 24
(1989) 86–7. Also available at http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1875/
gotha/index.htm. The original German text, Kritik des Gothaer Programms, reads: ‘Das
Recht kann seiner Natur nach nur in Anwendung von gleichem Maasstab [sic]
bestehn; aber die ungleichen Individuen (und sie wären nicht verschiedne Indivi-
duen, wenn sie nicht Ungleiche wären) sind nur an gleichem Massstab messbar, so
weit man sie unter einen gleichen Gesichtspunkt bringt, sie nur von einer bestimmter
Seite fasst, z.B. im gegebnen Fall sie nur als Arbeiter betrachtet, und weiter nichts in
ihnen sieht, von allem andern absieht.’ Cf Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels Gesamtaus-
gabe Bnd 25 (1985) 14.
27 Georg Lukács History and Class Consciousness Merlin Press Paperback ed (1974)
83–222.
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Dwelling on this history would lead us too far away from present
concerns, so let us move directly to Adorno to pick up on the resonance of
the Gotha Programme in a passage from his main work Negative Dialectics that
appeared in 1968. Note that Adorno’s text again points our attention to the
language of law and rights. He writes:
‘Right is the primeval phenomenon of irrational rationality. It makes the
principal of formal equivalence the only applicable norm. It cuts all sizes over
the same last. Such equality, in which differences perish, surreptitiously
privileges inequality.’28
At issue in this essential thought of the Marxist and neo-Marxist tradition
is a critique of the law’s logic of analogy, comparison and equation that
destroys or ignores difference, destroys or ignores the unique singularity of
the individual and the particular. How can one terminate this logic or escape
from it in a time that, probably for both good and bad reasons, no longer
convincingly affords one the grand historical narrative of the abolition of the
state and law? Is there another narrative or kind of narrative that can deliver
us from the law’s compulsory comparisons?
Adorno’s thinking took an aesthetic turn in the wake of a realisation that
philosophical or systematic thinking cannot save us from the logic of identity, as
he called this logic of comparison, analogy and equation that destroys the
unique singularity and non-identity of the particular. According to Adorno,
philosophical and systematic thinking was itself a product of this logic of
identity. He therefore turned to art to explore the possibility of retrieving or
salvaging the non-identical uniqueness of the singular from the devastating
conceptual equations of law and philosophy.29 Nussbaum’s argument that
literature can inform lawyers and judges with a literary imagination that will
enable them to do justice to the speciﬁcity of a particular or individual case
appears to have much in common with Adorno’s turn to aesthetics to escape
from the generalising logic of identity in law and philosophy. This essay
ultimately contends that this is not the case. If it is mercy towards the singular
and the speciﬁc thatAdorno contemplates with his aesthetics of non-identity,
it is surely not just a mercy that brieﬂy suspends and softens the law only to
reinstate its harsh material substructures, but a forceful mercy that aims to
shake the very foundations of law. It is doubtful whether Nussbaum’s
invocation of mercy has any real foundation-shaking aspiration in mind. But
there is a curious slippage in her essay ‘Equity and mercy’ that does point us,
perhaps unwontedly, towards something much more fundamental than a
mere suspension and sweetening of the law. Let us revisit the last sentence of
the passage quoted above:
28 Translated from Theodor WAdorno Negative Dialektik Suhrkamp Taschenbuch
(1975) 304: ‘Recht is das Urphänomen irrationaler Rationalität. In ihm wird das
formale Äquivalenzprinzip zur Norm, alle schlägt es über denselben Leisten. Solche
Gleichheit, in der die Differenzen untergehen, leistet geheim der Ungleichheit Vors-
chub.’
29 Adorno Ästhetische Theorie SuhrkampTaschenbuch (1980).
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‘[T]he spectator or reader, if he or she reads well, is already prepared for equity
and, in turn, for mercy.’30
This is a curious sentence that merits close scrutiny. It does not read, as
requirements of logic and semantics may have required it to do, as follows:
‘The spectator or reader, if he or she looks or reads well, is already prepared for
equity and, in turn, for mercy.’ No, the sentence provides one with
non-synonymous alternatives as far as the subject, but not so as far as the verb
is concerned. The effect of this curious sentence is that Nussbaum actually
turns the spectator into a reader. The spectator at a play is not someone who
looks at a spectacle, but one who reads the textual construction of the tragedy
or the tragic. And it is this reading that prepares him or her for equity and
mercy. Perhaps one should question whether the use of the word ‘spectator’
is at all apt here, whether it is at all ﬁt to denote those who attend the
performance of a tragic play. This is in fact one of the crucial themes in
Marlene van Niekerk’s novel Agaat. As will have become clear above, Agaat
confronts us with the irreducible difference between spectators and readers,
between those stuck in ready images and those open to the complexity of
language and linguistic existence. And in doing so, the novel also provides us
with a ﬁctional suspension and disruption of the law, a ﬁctional disruption of
the law that is not just ﬁctitious. If a reading of Agaat can point us to an
equitable and merciful sensibility that not only reinstates the law after a
superﬁcial challenge (perhaps with a softening of sentence), but incisively and
consistently questions the law’s speculative foundations and merciless capital-
ist substructures, it will surely invoke a justice beyond law. In true Marxist or
Marxian fashion it will have pointed us to the end of law, the termination of
law that is also the end of law in another sense: the termination of law that is also
the very point, purpose and aspiration of the law. One should therefore not
underestimate the revolutionary force — the state- and law-disrupting force
— of that which Nancy has come to call Marxisme littéraire. At issue in this
literary Marxism, we have seen above, is an errant writing that constantly
disrupts the state and all states of affairs, legal states of affairs included, for the
sake of the unique particularities and singularities of existence.31
Is literary Marxism offered here as a substitute for real political and
revolutionary action? Surely not. On the contrary, it seeks to inspire
signiﬁcant political action. It seeks to precipitate the ﬁrst stirring and
awakening of the critical imagination that conditions such action.32 But it
30 Cf note 12 supra.
31 Cf notes 4 and 5 supra.
32 As such, it already constitutes political action. Rosemarie Buikema makes this
point well in her reﬂection on the poem-like ‘miniatures’ in Agaat: ‘[T]he power of
Agaat lies in the unprecedented abundance of poetic language, in linguistic associa-
tions and stylistic experiments, in the deployment of novel words, images, and
streams of consciousness. Every little miniature . . . shows that this novel does not
lend itself to a univocal identity-constituting appropriation. At the same time, the
experimental style and the poetic language demonstrate that in a context of racial and
patriarchal violence, literariness and politics do not constitute separate domains.’ Cf
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also seeks to inform the political action that it inspires and precipitates with a
literary sensibility that would prevent it from taking itself too literally. To the
extent that all political and all revolutionary action aims at founding a new
polity or community and a new social organisation, it cannot escape from the
need to lay down rules that will have to be enforced for that community to
function. And this will often take place with painful coercion that will surely
deny again the uniqueness and singularity of the one who wishes to make an
exception for him or herself by not playing by the rules.AMarxism that turns
on the notion that the law will disappear after the revolution or one that
contends that whatever rules will have to be maintained then, will be
respected and obeyed out of revolutionary love and fervour, takes itself too
seriously and too literally.33 It is a cruel myth, a myth that needs to be
interrupted with a regard for the sheer errancy and non-conformity of
human desire. Such a literal Marxism, should it ever again materialise, would
be merciless, for it would not be able to imagine in a literary fashion the story
of the unique and singular desire that moves the deviant to fall out of the
‘love’ others hold in common. For this errant desire, the ‘common love’ of
others will have turned again into the formal equality demanded by an
overlapping consensus. It will have turned into the same standard and the same last
over which all sizes are cut without regard for the exceptional. This will be so
irrespective whether the causes for falling out of love are sublime (continued
or renewed revolutionary, political or artistic fervour) or banal (merely selﬁsh
and criminal). But the literal Marxist will of course not care to distinguish
thus between the sublime and the banal.
IV LAW AND LITERATURE: A TALE OF TWO NARRATIVES
Approaching the law from the point of view of literature or invoking
literature or literary studies in order to understand law better is no longer a
novel undertaking. The genre or subdivision of legal studies known as ‘law
and literature’ has established itself ﬁrmly in law journals and other law
publications. Many prominent law journals have in recent years dedicated
special issues to this ﬁeld of inquiry and some expressly present themselves as
Rosemarie Buikema ‘Theft and ﬂight in the arts’ (2009) 16 European Journal of
Women’s Studies 309. Thus do beauty and the poetic constitute the very inception of
political action, the sharp thin edge of the wedge without which political action
becomes a blunt instrument that destroys more than it can hope to create.
33 For an exemplary case, cf Alain Badiou St Paul — La Fondation de l’universalisme
(1997) 83–4. Not even the noble Buenaventura Durruti and the anarchist movement
in Spain could avoid the fate of having to impose the ground rules of the movement
on members who soon after their ﬁrst victories began to abuse their newly-gained
power for personal and selﬁsh reasons. For a narration of these events, cf Magnus
Enzensberger Der kurze Sommer der Anarchie: Buenaventura Durrutis Leben und Tod:
Roman Suhrkamp Taschenbuch (1972). I am indebted to Emilios Christodoulidis for
bringing this sublime novel tomy attention.
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fora for this strand of legal theory.34 And it is crucial to take into account here
that one of the most celebrated legal theorists of our time, Ronald Dworkin,
views the law as a kind of chain novel, in the writing of which all judges who
do their work well participate.35
According to Dworkin, judges who judge well contribute new chapters to
a novel that other judges have started before them. Their task is always to
continue the story in the best way possible, without prejudicing the integrity
of the already existing narrative. Continuing the novel in the best way
possible means continuing it in the best way possible in view of the speciﬁc
narrative criteria of the law; criteria such as justice, fairness, reasonableness,
ﬁdelity to principle, and so forth. Style, rhetoric, and linguistic or poetic
sensitivity may contribute marginally to the excellence of this narrative, but
surely do not play a central role in it. Crucial to Dworkin’s legal narrative is in
fact exactly the identity logic from which Adorno sought to escape with his
turn to aesthetics. Dworkin’s chain novel requires that the law stays
essentially the same through all the twists and turns that it may take in the face
of new circumstances. The Dworkinian chain novel must maintain its
essential identity. It does not offer us an escape from the identity logic of the
law. For such an escape we would have to turn to a completely different kind
of novel, an errant novel that constantly takes leave of its beginnings, a novel
that does not construct its characters in a coherent fashion, but one that
deconstructs them in a way that exposes them to the irreducible surprise of
their existence. For what else can be at issue in the singularity and uniqueness
that Marx andAdorno pursued, than an openness to the surprise of existence
that ultimately subverts all categories of equation and comparison? What else
can be at issue in the mercy that Nussbaum pursues, than openness to the
surprises of existence that are often also painful and destructive, often
devastating and unforgivable?
What kind of novel would reﬂect this errant narrative that, unlike
Dworkin’s principled chain novel, constantly takes leave of itself, relentlessly
opens new spaces and thus frustrates any desire for a return to an essential
identity? Italo Calvino’s If on a Winter’s Night a Traveller is a good example of a
novel that aspires to such an errant narrative. It does not attain to the pure
errancy to which it aspires, for it returns to itself in crucial passages which do
reﬂect hermeneutical or juridical statements about the point or possible point
of the novel. But the overall thrust of Calvino’s narrative is surely that of a
fragmentary opening of new narrative spaces, spaces that only hang together
in a juxtaposed fashion. The fragmentary character of the narrative is already
clear from the already halfway or under-way ring of the title that also
constitutes the ﬁrst sentence. The novel thus starts without a proper origin by
taking its lead from a conditional: If on a Winter’s Night a Traveller. And from
34 For the breadth of this movement and references to the key publications that
constituted it, see the discussions in Posner Law and Literature op cit note 9 at vii–viii;
IanWard Law and Literature (1995) 3–27.
35 Ronald Dworkin Law’s Empire (1986) 228–38.
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then on it simply persists with inconsequential sequences. When the reader
has read through a good number of pages of this continuing juxtaposition of
narrative fragments, she might quite understandably begin to experience a
nagging need for some narrative continuity. The inception of this need (its
displacement of the openness and curiosity of desire) is the inception of the
juridical or the legal. It is the inception of a need for accounts and assessments
of narrative coherence and integrity à la Dworkin. Calvino understands this
need and therefore comes to the reader’s avail by inserting, among several,
the following illuminating passage into the novel’s string of non-
consequential sequences:
‘The book I would like to read now is a novel in which you sense the story
arriving like still-vague thunder, the historical story along with the individual’s
story, a novel that gives the sense of living through an upheaval that still has no
name, has not yet taken shape. . . .’36
This is one of the most juridical or hermeneutic points in the novel. One
can say it constitutes a juridical lapse into a hermeneutic circularity (in terms
of which it returns to itself and assesses or judges its own meaning) in an
otherwise purely literary or errant narrative. But this juridical point or lapse
clearly speaks against itself, against this illuminating closeness to itself. It
articulates a desire for the remote and the vague, the far off thunder that has
not taken shape and has no name yet. And as a juridical point it is correct or
just. It describes the novel aptly. If on a Winter’s Night a Traveller is indeed a
novel that leaves the reader with an experience of ‘living through an
upheaval that still has no name, has not yet taken shape. . .’. It leaves the
reader indeed with an experience of shards and chips that ﬂy in all directions,
chips that ﬂy from a violent chiselling from which no image becomes
apparent. It leaves one with the sense of a secret that is happening and keeps
on happening. Everything that Calvino offers the reader remains hanging or
ﬂying. Nothing alights, touches down, or comes to rest again. It simply
remains suspended like chips sent hurtling from a secret divide that remains
irreducibly undivided. The shards simply remain suspended. Calvino’s novel
thus does not constitute the splitting of the universe (the ultimate secret of
things) by one little chisel.37 No, the novel only constitutes the ﬂying shards
that point to a still un-split secret in a falsifying and apocryphal way. As
Calvino explains this in another self-resisting juridical lapse closer to the end
of the novel:
‘Apocrypha (from the Greek apokryphos, hidden, secret): (1) originally referring
to the ‘‘secret books’’ of religious sects; later to texts not recognized as canonical
in those religions which have established a canon of revealed writings; referring
to texts falsely attributed to a period or to an author. . . . Perhaps my true
vocation was that of an author of apocrypha, in the several meanings of the term:
because writing always means hiding something in such a way that it then is
discovered; because the truth that can come from my pen is like a shard that has
36 Italo Calvino If on a Winter’s Night a TravellerVintage Paperback ed (1988) 72.
37 Cf ‘Die Beiteltjie’ inN PvanWyk Louw Versamelde Gedigte (1981) 186.
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been chipped from a great boulder by a violent impact, then ﬂung far away;
because there is no certitude outside falsiﬁcation.’38
From a purely literary point of view, the crucial lack evident in Dworkin’s
integrity-centred understanding of the law in terms of a neat and coherent
chain narrative is exactly that it does not appreciate what it means when the
chips are really ﬂying. This lack of appreciation is evident from the way the
chain novel claims to put together seamlessly the shards and fragments of lives
sent hurtling by legal conﬂict between two individuals or between an
individual and the state.39 Dworkin’s understanding of the law just does not
appreciate that the eruption of conﬂict sends fragments of life hurtling into
empty space and ends in irredeemable loss, irredeemable loss of living matter,
be this loss glaringly obvious and heartbreaking — recall Soobramoney v
Minister or Health40 — or microscopically small, just grains of failed aspirations
that disappear in the mundane dust of the quotidian (take any ‘minor’
private-law dispute that ends in a lower court and leaves one party the
winner and the other the devastated loser). It has no regard for the fact that
the remaining pieces have jagged edges that cannot be measured and ﬁt into a
ﬁne jigsaw puzzle that reconstructs the whole in seamless or nearly seamless
fashion. It has no regard for ruins, let alone a love of ruins.41 In contrast to this
comparative, analogical and principled Dworkinian chain narrative that
conﬁdently claims to reconstruct the shattered whole without scars or seams
remaining, the literary narrative reminds us more of the dissociating chain
narrative that children develop in the ‘little telephone’ game they often play,
softly whispering a message into the ear of the next one in line only to marvel
at how and where the message ends up when the last in the line comes to
reconstruct it. And this errant narrative, I wish to claim, is much more intact
with the reality of law and the legal resolution of conﬂict, than the
Dworkinian one that always remains intact with its origin, or claims to do so,
38 Calvino If on a Winter’s Night a Traveller op cit note 36 at 192.
39 Cf Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously 2 ed (1978) 116. The law may not
really be that seamless, but this is nevertheless how judges should assume it to be.
40 Cf Soobramoney v Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal (1997) 12 BCLR 1696
(CC). The case concerned Mr Soobramoney’s claim in the Constitutional Court of
South Africa that the rights to life and health care entrenched in the South African
Constitution obliged the government to provide him with urgently needed kidney
dialysis treatment for which he could not pay himself. The health authorities of
KwaZulu Natal (the province in which Mr Soobramoney lived) argued in response
that resources were limited and that kidney dialysis treatment had to be restricted to
patients whose overall health condition justiﬁed the treatment. Mr Soobramoney had
a serious heart condition on top of his kidney problems which disqualiﬁed him from
receiving the dialysis treatment from the state. The Constitutional Court accepted the
arguments of the health authorities and dismissed Mr Soobramoney’s claim. Mr
Soobramoney died a week after judgment was passed.
41 Cf Derrida Force de Loi: Le Fondament Mystique de L’Autorité (1994) 105; Vis-
mann ‘The love of ruins’ (2001) 9 Perspectives on Science: Historical, Philosophical, Social
196; Johan van derWalt Law and Sacrifice (2005) 197.
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notwithstanding the new narrative turns it takes to meet circumstantial
exigencies.
It is important also to note the different timeframes that characterise the
Dworkinian and the pure literary narrative exempliﬁed or at least approxi-
mated by Calvino’s If on a Winter’s Night a Traveller. The successful recon-
structions of the law in the Dworkinian narrative imply effective
terminations of the divisive conﬂicts at issue. Things — frustrations, failed
aspirations, unsatisfactory resolutions — come to rest in the legal resolution
of conﬂict and thus allow us to begin again with a clean slate. Under the
auspices of this narrative, conﬂict is always new conﬂict that results from
someone simply failing anew to subscribe to the established reason of the law.
That new conﬂict is invariably a matter of old conﬂict not properly resolved
and not properly understood — an event still nameless and shapeless — is
something the Dworkinian narrative cannot contemplate. Such contempla-
tion would destroy its conﬁdent claim of having reached right answers in
view of the just and equitable rules, principles and founding morality of the
law. The Dworkinian narrative tells the story of an initial state of innocence
suddenly destroyed by the eruption of the unreasonable. At issue in this story
is not necessarily a grand myth of a golden time at the beginning of history,
but surely a small cousin of this myth that seeks to establish the notion of
relative states of innocent reasonableness in the wake of judicial resolutions of
conﬂict. It is a myth of a legal society that always manages to return to its
original and exemplary form and identity. It is the myth of a social space
where nothing happens apart from minor unfortunate incidents that never
really threaten the fundamental coherence of this space.
The story Calvino wants us to read, in contrast, is one that relates ‘an
upheaval that still has no name’ and ‘has not yet taken shape’. At issue in
Calvino’s literary narrative is an event that is still happening and never ceases
to happen. It is a story of chips being ﬂung away continuously and never
coming to rest again. It relates the event as an upheaval ‘through which we
are still living’ and therefore has no name and shape yet. Dworkin’s narrative,
on the other hand, reduces the event to an occurrence that belongs to an
unhappy past, a past that the law has helped us and will always help us to
overcome.
Viewed, indeed viewed as a past occurrence, the event and the law that
settles the event become something that can be looked at, something of
which we can form an image, something with regard to which we become
spectators. Dworkin’s narrative may require us to compare and trace a series
of judicial and legislative images through which the law comes to the fore,
but the way it allows the judge to extract from his reading of the law a clear
and conclusive understanding of the law, reduces or transforms his reading
into a picture that can be viewed. Dworkin reduces the history of law to a
series of well-formed images. His theory is ultimately a picture theory of the
law, irrespective of the interpretive, hermeneutic or Wittgensteinian turn
that his theory claims to represent. He turns the reader into a spectator. Let us
retrace our steps and recall in contrast that Nussbaum’s concern with mercy
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and equity requires the transformation of even the spectator into a reader, not
readers into spectators. This is so because mercy, like the act of reading,
remains irreducibly suspended in a state of disarticulation, a state of living
through an upheaval that has no name and form yet. It does not afford us a
picture of things.42
In which regard is Agaat faithful to Calvino’s rather than to Dworkin’s
chain novel?
Agaat reminds us of a difference that cannot be compared to anything else,
a difference that continues to upset the comparative strategies through which
the human individuals constantly seek to maintain and restore a lawful or
legal space between them. This difference subverts and unsettles all these
comparative strategies and whatever stable existence may be achieved
through them. The difference at stake in Agaat allows not for a comfortable
and serene co-existence. It is a difference that comes to the reader by way of
an interminable upheaval, one that ultimately cannot take shape or receive a
name, one that remains an irreducible secret. This then is the reading of Agaat
to which one is invited here: Agaat is an apocryphal narrative of an unﬁnished
upheaval.
This reading of Agaat must, however, anticipate an elementary objection.
Although Agaat is to some extent written in a fragmentary manner, although
the story line is constantly disrupted by shifts between detailed descriptions of
the bodily process of Milla de Wet’s dying in the present, on the one hand,
and her troubling memories of the past, on the other, the novel is not nearly
as enigmatic and fragmentary as If on a Winter’s Night a Traveller. Agaat allows
the reader to make herself at home fairly easily amid these switches between
past and present. And one might add that this kind of narrative is hardly
uncommon in contemporary and even not so contemporary literature.43
42 This reading of Dworkin is not only informed by Calvino. It is also informed by
the critique of the metaphysics of presence, representation and picturing that is
articulated in the works of Heidegger, Derrida, Nancy and several other signiﬁcant
thinkers of our time. For one of the most poignant articulations in Heidegger’s work,
cf the essay ‘Die Zeitalter des Weltbildes’ in Martin Heidegger Holzwege (1950). For
some of Derrida’s most forceful articulations, cf again the early essay ‘Le théâtre de la
cruaté et la clôture de la représentation’op cit note 13 at 348–50 and his sublime essay
on Célan in Schibboleth (1986). This is also the main concern of all the major themes of
Derrida’s later work — justice, hospitality, friendship, impossibility, event, ghost. All
these themes involve Derrida’s work in the phenomenological articulation (epokhé) of
an irreducible conﬂict between the concern with spectral phenomena that render present
but are never present themselves and cannot be represented, on the one hand, and the
need to sacriﬁce this concern for its own sake to the representational dynamics of
meaningful language and communication, on the other. Hence also the centrality of
the notion of sacriﬁce in his work. Cf in this regard the signiﬁcant remark in Voyous
(2003) 205n1: ‘Quant à la notion du sacrifice . . . j’en ai tant écrit qu’une page de
références n’y sufﬁrait pas.’
43 To give just a few examples that come to mind from recent readings, cf W G
Sebald Austerlitz Fischer Taschenbuch (2003), Max Frisch Stiller Suhrkamp Taschen-
buch (1954), Anne Michaels Fugitive Pieces (1996), Karel Schoeman Die Uur van die
Engel (1995).
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Irrespective of the unavoidable suspense or state of suspension, the sense of
having to remain in degrees of teasing ignorance while the plot unfolds that
accompanies the reading of the most simple of narratives, the reader hardly
ever has a disturbing sense of really not knowing what is going on while
reading Agaat. The narrative evinces much greater coherence and is much
more assessable than If on a Winter’s Night a Traveller. Does this greater
coherence not bring Agaat much more in line with Dworkin’s seamless chain
novel and quite out of line with the narrative that seeks to live through a
shapeless and nameless upheaval?
No. An errant narrative need not be fragmentary, puzzling or confusing.
One can say a novel need not be cryptic to be apocryphal. Consider the
narrative in Umberto Eco’s The Name of the Rose. It is surely intricate and
complex, but all-in-all, reasonably straightforward. And yet, the closing lines
of The Name of the Rose indicate clearly that this narrative should ultimately
also leave us pondering an impenetrable secret.
‘[I]t is hard for this old monk, on the threshold of death, not to know whether
the letter he has written contains some hidden meaning, or more than one, or
many, or none at all. . . . Where are the snows of yesteryear? The earth is
dancing the dance of Macabré; at times it seems to me that the Danube is
crowded with ships loaded with fools going to a dark place. All I can do now is
be silent. . . . I leave this manuscript, I do not know for whom; I no longer
know what it is about: Stat rosa pristina nomine, nomine nuda tenemus.’44
Agaat surely provides the reader with enough information for the purposes
of constructing a coherent plot. In what sense can it then still be regarded as
apocryphal, as an inevitably falsifying engagement with a secret, with an
upheaval that cannot be named yet? What is Agaat’s secret, the secret with
which the novel engages with so many names and words but cannot name?
What in Agaat is the pristine rose of which we only retain the bare name?
As already stated above, we will never know. We will never get there. For
the reader who is resolutely not a spectator Agaat remains an upheaval
without a name. One can at most hint at its secret by grace of more or less
44 Umberto Eco The Name of the Rose Picador Paperback ed (1984) 501–2. See also
the resonating passage in Foucault’s Pendulum Quality Paperbacks Direct (1990) 619–
20: ‘We invented a nonexistent Plan, and They not only believed it was real but
convinced themselves that They had been part of it for ages, or rather, They identiﬁed
the fragments of their muddled mythology as moments of our Plan, moments joined
in a logical, irrefutable web of analogy, semblance, suspicion. . . . A plot, if there is to
be one, must remain secret. A secret that, if we only knew it, would dispel our
frustration, lead us to salvation; or else the knowing of it in itself would be salvation.
Does such a luminous secret exist? Yes, provided it is never known.’And The Island of
the Day Before (1995) 511–12 also attends the banquet of irreducible historical latency,
errancy, and imminence: ‘He realized now that in a less speciﬁc, less obviously theat-
rical fashion, experienced through little surprises day after day, this sensation of
Repose Denied was something he had known ﬁrst in Provence, then in Paris, where
everyone he encountered somehow destroyed a certitude of his, each proposing a
different map of the world, but the various proposals never cohered into a ﬁnite
design.’
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forceful falsiﬁcations, more or less effective fabrications from which the
secret itself will always withdraw again. This essay will end with such a
falsiﬁcation, but before we turn to this apocryphal ending we ﬁrst need to
look at the canonical narrative of the law again, the narrative of the law that,
in compliance with Dworkin’s demand, always remains a true reﬂection of
itself and of course of others. There is nothing that this legal narrative cannot
claim to know. The law does not engage with secrets. Its narrative thus does
not allow for apocryphal falsiﬁcations. It only allows for errors that must be
discarded so that its transparent coherence and self-transparent integrity can
be advanced.
V THERE IS NOTHING THAT THE LAW DOES NOT UNDER-
STAND
(a) Mercy in criminal law
Taking our cue from an incident that allegedly (most likely apocryphally so)
came to pass in the court of the late Judge Gert Coetzee, a message
transmitted in a courtroom by the almost invisible movements of an already
half paralysed eyelid, could meet with interesting responses. After having
found the accused guilty of the charges brought against him, the late Judge
asked him whether he wanted to say anything to the court. ‘Nothing,’ came
the barely audible reply, voiced in a very low voice as if meant for the ears of
the accused himself only. Startled for a moment, the Judge turned to one of
the court ofﬁcials who happened to be closer to the accused at that moment
and asked: ‘What did he say?’ ‘Nothing, your Honour’ came the reply. ‘My
word’, responded the Judge, ‘I could swear I saw his lips move’.45
The mutation of meaning that comes to pass in this little story points our
attention to something that happens on a daily basis in courtrooms. Judges
and magistrates rely daily on semantic constructions on the basis of which
words, gestures and even the silence of an accused are raised to juridical
meaning. An abyssal gap thus opens between the words of the accused and
the understanding of the judge, a gap that allows the words or gesture of the
accused to disappear into nothingness. In the little story at issue here, that
which the accused seeks to express with a muted ‘nothing’ — desperation,
aggression, rebellion, a last communication of difference and otherness (or
non-indifferent indifference) — mutates into nothingness, into a failure to
speak.
There are countless ways in which this mutation of meaning in the
semantic construction of juridical meaning can be illustrated, but the simple
construction of ‘intent’ in a criminal trial is surely one of the most obvious
and most signiﬁcant examples that one can contemplate in this regard. No
system of criminal procedure can escape the crisis of the abyssal gap between
45 One does not want to use crude language here but replace in your minds the
‘nothing’uttered here with a word beginning with the sixth letter of the alphabet and
youwill know the original version of the story.
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the forensic construction of a crime and the inner reality of the mind of the
accused, the inner reality of the will to act unlawfully, the inner reality of
knowledge of unlawfulness, the inner reality of criminal accountability, the
inner reality of remorse or lack of it. We saw in the introduction above that
the Victorian novel played a signiﬁcant part in the rise of a culture that in so
many ways claimed to see through and know the criminal mind.
Nineteenth-century criminal procedure in England nevertheless resisted this
‘privileged epistemology’ for a considerable time. English law has for most of
its existence endorsed the ﬁfteenth-century dictum of Justice Brian that ‘the
thought of man is not triable, for the devil himself knoweth not the thought
of man’.46 The new disciplines of psychology and psychiatry of the Victorian
age sought to dislodge this centuries-old endorsement, but Justice Coleridge
still reminded his jury in 1849 that ‘no one can see into the mind of man’ and
thus resisted the claims of medical experts that this could be done.47 The
instruction to the jury, incidentally, did not raise the possibility of the accused
saying ‘nothing’, but it did invoke the possibility of the accused saying
nothing:
‘The inquiry into intent is far less simple than that as to whether an act has been
committed, because you cannot look into a man’s mind to see what was passing
there at any given time. What he intends can only be judged by what he does
and says, and if he says nothing, then this act alone must guide you to your
decision.’48
This resistance to the privileged epistemology of the Victorians would
nevertheless not survive for long and its collapse would be abundantly
evident in an inﬂuential essay that J W C Turner published in 1936. It will
soon become clear that signs of the collapse were already evident in 1891, but
let us begin with the viewTurner articulated in 1936:
‘Now it is obvious that it is impossible really to know for certain what was
passing in the mind of the accused person; it can only be surmised by a process
of inference from what is known of his conduct. Of course in early times the
difﬁculty felt in ascertaining the mind of man and the rule that a prisoner could
not himself give evidence tended to produce the practice of imputing mens rea
from certain given sets of circumstances. In more modern days the difﬁculty has
not been regarded as insuperable.’49
By 1952, when Turner published the sixteenth edition of Kenny’s Outlines
46 Rodensky The Crime in Mind op cit note 15 at 27, quoting from the Vide
Yearbook of 1477 (17 Edward IV 1).
47 This was in the case of R v Monkhouse (1859) 4 Cox 55. Cf Rodensky The Crime
in Mind op cit note 15 at 181.
48 Ibid (for both references in note 47).
49 L J Turner ‘The mental element in crimes at common law’ in LRadzinowicz &
L J Turner (eds) The Modern Approach to Criminal Law (1945) 199. The Cambridge Law
Journal originally published the essay in 1936. See also the quotation and discussion of
Turner’s remark in Farmer ‘Criminal responsibility and the proof of guilt’ op cit note
1 at 42. I am indebted to Farmer’s essay for many of the key references to the history
of English criminal procedure onwhich this essay relies.
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of Criminal Law he had obviously become bolder than he was in the 1936
essay. Marginalising or, for all practical purposes, ignoring the long history
from Justice Brian to Justice Coleridge that clearly emphasised the inability to
put the mind of the accused on trial, Turner now claimed the following:
‘By the end of the Middle Ages the courts had abandoned the notion that the
mind of man cannot be investigated. Bowen LJ in 1891 declared such a
principle to be fallacious and said ‘‘so far from saying that you cannot look into a
man’s mind, you must look into it, if you are going to ﬁnd fraud against him;
and unless you think you see what must have been in his mind, you cannot ﬁnd
him guilty of fraud.’’Once it had been admitted that some degree of wickedness
was a requisite in criminal guilt, it followed logically that mens rea must
eventually become a subjective matter of an increasingly subtle kind.’50
Turner’s thinking in this regard marks or accompanies a fundamental shift
in English criminal procedure. Earlier criminal procedure recognised the
impossibility of knowing the mind of the criminal and ultimately had to rely
on presumptions to establish mens rea, central to which was the presumption
that the accused must have intended the criminal consequences of the actus
reus when these consequences were the natural and inevitable result of his
conduct. The new or modern criminal procedure would rely increasingly on
extensive evidence actually to determine or reconstruct the subjective state
of mind of the accused and conﬁdently claimed the capacity to do so. The
normative argument or justiﬁcation that accompanies this turn in criminal
procedure holds it to reﬂect increased respect for the autonomy and liberty of
the accused, punishment of whom could not be justiﬁed without establishing
the truth of his or her criminal intent. A more realistic and more respectful
regard for the impenetrable secret of the accused’s mind need not dismiss this
normative argument completely. Respect for the autonomy and liberty of
the accused surely requires the most extensive proof of mens rea that systems
of criminal procedure can afford. But no quantitative and qualitative
extension of proof warrants the ultimate leap from the arguably ‘valid’
presumptions that extensive forensic evidence affords criminal procedure to an
assumption that the subjective state of mind of the accused is conclusively
assessable. And as long as this leap remains unwarranted, the normative
arguments that accompany the reconstructive trial should always remain
subject to a critical regard for the abyssal hiatus between the legitimating
functions of normative arguments and the ultimate lack of legitimacy from
which the limits of human knowledge cannot save them.51 The more legal
50 Quoted thus by Rodensky The Crime in Mind op cit note 15 at 27 from
L J Turner Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law 16 ed (1952) 24. I had no access to the
1952 edition, but the same passage appears unchanged in Turner Kenny’s Outlines of
Criminal Law 19 ed (1962) 32.
51 Cf in this regard Farmer’s Foucaultian argument (‘Criminal responsibility and
the proof of guilt’ op cit note 1 at 44, 58) that the rise of the reconstructive trial was
not so much an expression of the normative liberal values regarding individual
autonomy and dignity as it was a vehicle for new forms of governance of the new
constructions of subjectivity.
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consciousness complacently ignores this hiatus, the more its normative
underpinnings turn into empty ideology.
The debate between the respective exponents of the normative and
psychological approaches to criminal law is still with us, also in South Africa.52
The psychological approach demands that criminal intent be proved by
establishing the subjective state of mind of the accused. The normative
approach concedes that proof of criminal intent must ultimately reconcile
itself with a normative assessment of criminal conduct that relies fundamentally
on the presumption or maxim that the accused ‘must have’ intended the
natural and inevitable consequences of his or her conduct. (The normative
approach must not be confused with the ‘normative arguments’ invoked in
the previous paragraph. Those normative arguments in fact endorse the
psychological proof of criminal intent and consider the normative approach
to this proof mentioned in this paragraph unsatisfactory.)
The normative approach surely causes fundamental problems for concep-
tualist understandings of criminal theory, given the way it ultimately collapses
the conceptual distinction between the unlawfulness of the conduct and the
culpability of the accused. It surely also poses serious questions to the political
liberal justiﬁcation of criminal procedure. After all, forgoing the proof of
subjective intent leaves one with the disconcerting realisation that one’s
system of criminal procedure turns on nothing more than arresting, prose-
cuting and convicting the suspect forensically proven to have been closest to
the scene of the crime. But a critical or self-critical adoption of the normative
approach that remains acutely or sufﬁciently aware of the epistemological
limit to which this approach subjects criminal procedure surely evinces a
52 However, the subjective or psychological approach is clearly still dominant in
South Africa. Cf Jonathan Burchell & John Milton Principles of Criminal Law 3 ed
(2005) 459–60; C R Snyman Criminal Law 5 ed (2008) 188–90. C R Snyman ‘The
tension between legal theory and policy considerations in the general principles of
criminal law’ 2003 Acta Juridica 2–3 relates the preponderance of the psychological or
subjective approach to criminal culpability in South African law to the inﬂuence of
De Wet & Swanepoel’s Strafreg (ﬁrst published in 1949). De Wet was strongly inﬂu-
enced by the classical school in German and Dutch criminal-law theorists which
included authors such as Von Liszt-Schmidt, Von Hippel, Beling, Zevenbergen, Von
Hamel, Pompe and Vos. This school stressed the subjective requirements for liability,
lumped these requirements under the concept of culpability (Schuld) and developed
the so-called ‘psychological theory of culpability’. This classical understanding of
criminal law and its psychological theory of culpability dominated the theory of criminal
law in Germany and other continental European countries till the 1920s, but was
then replaced by new approaches among which the normative concept of culpability was
prominent. The objective test for culpability in terms of which intention could be
linked to ‘conduct the consequences of which could reasonably be expected by an
ordinary person’ came into vogue. However, De Wet stuck to his ‘subjective view of
culpability’ in all later editions of Strafreg, right up to the fourth and last edition that
appeared in 1985, despite the fact that the German literature to which he referred in
the later editions evinced a fundamentally different view of criminal culpability. And
De Wet’s views regarding culpability remained the dominant inﬂuence on South
African courts, especially in key decisions of the formerAppellate Division.
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deeper respect for the unfathomable secret of the subjective state of mind of
the accused.
Nussbaum simply dismisses this point in her critique of Justice Holmes’
resistance to ‘mentalist and intention-based notions of punishment’. Holmes
argued in The Common Law, perfectly in line with Justices Brian and
Coleridge, that ‘far from considering the condition of a man’s heart or
conscience’ in making a judgment, we should focus on ‘external standards
that are altogether independent of motive or intention.’53 He endorsed this
principle in a steadfast fashion that Nussbaum ﬁnds merciless, but he did so to
steer away from the merciless retributivism that sought to punish the insides
of the wrongdoer. ‘The desire for vengeance’, he wrote, ‘imports an opinion
that its object is individually and personally to blame. It takes an internal
standard, not an objective or external one, and condemns its victim by
that.’54
In response to Holmes, Nussbaum articulates an unabashedly mentalistic
approach to criminal procedure. The attitude of her ideal judge is ‘unasham-
edly mentalistic’:
‘It does not hesitate to use centrally the notions of intention, choice, reﬂection,
deliberation, and character that are part of a non-reductive intentionalist
psychology. Like the novel, it treats the inner world of the defendant as a deep
and complex place, and it instructs the judge to investigate that depth.’55
Nussbaum thus clearly aligns her concern with mercy rather paradoxically
with the merciless omniscience of the Victorian narrative that ultimately
triumphed over the signiﬁcant remnant of epistemological reticence in
Victorian criminal procedure as still evinced in Justice Coleridge’s instruction
to the jury in R v Monkhouse. It triumphed thus when modern criminal
procedure and the reconstructive trial commenced to claim the capacity to
prove the subjective state of mind of the accused. Nussbaum’s alliance with
this development is conﬁrmed by her choice of instructive literature. Where
others — Rodensky, Yeats56 — sense Victorian literature to be typical of the
unforgiving judgmentalism of the time, she selects a Victorian novel —
Dickens’David Copperfield — as one of the exemplary novels from which we
stand to gain a merciful sensibility. This paradox confronts one with a
question. Is David Copperfield an exception to the rule or are the views of
Rodensky and Yeats regarding the judgmentalism of the Victorian age just
too generalising?
53 Nussbaum ‘Equity and mercy’ op cit note 11 at 174. Nussbaum cites a later
edition (The Essential Holmes University of Chicago Press (1992) 253). For the rel-
evant passages in the 1st ed, see Holmes The Common Law (1881) 49-50. The remark-
able feature of these passages is Holmes’express awareness of the essential issue at stake
here, namely, ‘the sacriﬁce of the individual as far as necessary to accomplish [external
conformity to rule]’ at 49.
54 Holmes The Common Law op cit note 53 at 40 as quoted by Nussbaum op cit
note 11 at 174 (again from the 1992 edition).
55 Nussbaum ‘Equity andmercy’op cit note 11 at 173.
56 Cf note 16 supra.
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One need not attempt to answer this question here. Stating it and leaving
it hanging sufﬁce to draw the contrast between a literary Marxist and an
edifying understanding of the relation between law and literature. The law
and literature approach at issue in literary Marxism calls for a fundamental
resistance to the triumph of the omniscient Victorian narrative in the history
of English criminal procedure, irrespective of the question whether there
were exceptions to this omniscient judgmentalism in Victorian literature and
irrespective of the question whether this ‘omniscient judgmentalism’ in Victorian
literature is itself a literary construction. It need not prove the literal truth of its
assertions (it would be out of character). It does, however, need to keep on
reading and rereading, also Victorian literature, so as further to enrich its
narrative (for instance by eventually articulating a persuasive assessment of
Dickens’ narrative)57 and remain in the business of effective storytelling. But
57 Insufﬁcient familiarity with Dickens’ work prohibits me from offering such an
assessment here, but one small point may perhaps be risked. Nussbaum’s assessment of
the novel David Copperfield as one from which lawyers can learn mercy turns on
Copperﬁeld’s ‘non-judgmentalism’ vis-à-vis his friend and former schoolboy hero,
James Steerforth. This non-judgmentalism is supposedly evinced by Copperﬁeld’s
avowal never to think of Steerforth in terms of ‘his best’ or ‘his worst’, but simply in
terms of a love ‘that loved equally’ through good and bad. When he ultimately sees
the ‘gentlemen’ and ‘Oxford man’ Steerforth’s corpse washed ashore, after the latter
had earlier rather brutally broken up the relationship and wedding plans between the
‘commoners’ Emily and Ham without being able to offer Emily a future as a lady, as
she imagined, Copperﬁeld ultimately still ends up exclaiming, that he had always
thought of Steerforth in terms of ‘[his] best’. One does not want to spoil a sweet story
— David Copperfield is surely an entertaining read and quite a tear-wrench towards the
end and Dickens surely portrays Copperﬁeld as a likable, decent and benevolent man
— but there are big questions lurking behind this apparent benevolent and merciful
character. Why does Copperﬁeld’s benevolence and mercy not extend to the ‘con-
summate villain’ Uriah Heep? Dickens portrays Heep exclusively through the dis-
gusted and horriﬁed emotions of all the ‘decent characters’ who get to deal with
Heep, with Copperﬁeld ﬁrst in line. To answer this question one has to pay due
attention to the role of Heep in the narrative. He is another commoner, who unlike
the good ones — Pegotty, Barkis, Ham, Mr Pegotty — does not humbly and joyfully
accept his inferior social position, but fakes his ‘umbleness’ while gradually working
his way into a position where he can blackmail and defraud decent ladies and gentle-
men (Betsy Trotwood and Mr Wickﬁeld) out of their property and well-earned
careers. Property and the maintenance of property relations surely play a central role
in David Copperfield. The decent and gentlefolk ultimately get all their property back
from the ‘damp ﬁshy ﬁngers’ of Heep without losing anything, and Heep justly ends
up in jail towards the end of the novel. And the interim ‘loss of property’ (Betsy
Trotwood’s ruin as a result of Heep’s blackmailing and defrauding of Wickﬁeld)
ultimately serves as the important test through which Copperﬁeld proves himself
through enduring and dedicated hard work and talent. Ultimately the decent get
everything back and more. This complacent ethic turns into a rather tangible smug-
ness when Copperﬁeld observes that Traddles, who earlier married before he could
buy decent silver cutlery and had to make do with ‘Britannia metal’, through his hard
work can end up sitting ‘like a Patriarch’ at the end of a long table lined with exem-
plary children and friends, a long table surely ‘not glittering with Brittania metal’.
Apart from a last invocation of Copperﬁeld’s deep love for his Agnes, this scene of
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the responsibility to read on does not disqualify it from calling, during the
irreducibility of interims, for an experience with the errant and apocryphal
narrative of the accused which ultimately cannot but subvert fundamentally
the core epistemological claims of modern criminal procedure and the systems
of value and property relations that ultimately inform this epistemology.
The merciful subversion of modern criminal procedure by an errant and
apocryphal literary sensibility is of course partially already embodied in
criminal jurisdictions in which capital punishment has been abolished.
Criminal jurisdictions that avail themselves of capital punishment constitute
brutal endorsements of the epistemological hubris of modern criminal
procedure. The absolute irreversibility of capital punishment turns any
reliance on it into an unforgiving epistemological hubris. At issue in this
assertion is not only the so-called ‘fallibility of prosecution’ argument to
decent bourgeois familial bliss and patrimonial success basically ends and crowns a
huge and masterfully developed narrative. Italo Calvino (The Uses of Literature (1986)
190–2) surely only had Dickens’ mastery as far as vivid portrayal of characters and
scenes (‘his sense of theatre’) in mind when he called Dickens the master of spectacle.
But David Copperfield surely leaves one with some reason to believe that this mastery
regarding spectacle and the spectacular scene is accompanied by the speculative capi-
talist mindset and economy that Derrida and Bataille identiﬁed in Hegel’s speculative
dialectics. Cf Derrida L’Écriture et La Différence (1967) 369–407. In short, why is
Copperﬁeld’s compassionate embrace of the moral ambiguity of his fellow gentleman
Steerforth not accompanied with some thought as to how an unforgiving society can
turn some individuals into slimy and ‘ﬁshy ﬁngered’ plotters of wicked schemes and
ultimately into ‘consummate villains’? Even whenDickens comes closest to recognis-
ing systemic violence, he still resorts to writing Heep off as one of the rotten apples
brought forth by a particularly wicked family. Consider Heep’s description of his
upbringing: ‘Father and me was brought up at a foundation school for boys; and
mother, she was likewise brought up at a public, sort of charitable, establishment.
They taught us all a deal of umbleness — not much else that I know of, from morning
to night. We was to be umble to this person, and umble to that; and to pull off our
caps here, and to make bows there; and always to know our place, and abase ourselves
before our betters. And we had such a lot of betters! Father got the monitor-medal-
medal by being umble. So did I. Father got made a sexton by being umble. He had the
character, among the gentlefolks, of being such a well-behaved man, that they were
determined to bring him in. ‘‘Be umble, Uriah’’, says father to me, ‘‘and you’ll get
on’’. It was what was always being dinned into you and me at school; it’s what goes
down best. ‘‘Be umble,’’ says father, ‘‘and you’ll do!’’ And really it ain’t done bad!’
Copperﬁeld surmises in response: ‘It was the ﬁrst time it had ever occurred tome, that
this detestable cant of false humility might have originated out of the Heep family. I
had seen the harvest, but had never thought of the seed.’ Quoted from Charles
Dickens David Copperfield Penguin Popular Classics (1994) 471. That theHeep family
itself was also a harvest and not the ﬁrst seed does not appear to be part of Dickens’ and
surely not of Copperﬁeld’s thinking. Nussbaum acknowledges Dickens’ class con-
sciousness (his anti-unionist sensibilities) in Poetic Justice op cit note 11 at 33, 70) and
sympathises with Orwell’s criticism of Dickens in this regard. Cf George Orwell
Dickens, Dali and Others (1946) 1. But this acknowledgment and sympathy do not yet
point to an incisively critical regard for the underlying economics that conditions the
narrative in David Copperfield.
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which abolitionists frequently turn.58 At issue is the much further-reaching
question regarding the moral legitimacy of linking the inner state of mind of
the accused to the juridical constructions of intent and eventually convicting
and sentencing the accused on the basis of this link. This link remains deeply
questionable even under circumstances where the forensic construction of
the case can ‘for argument’s sake’ be said to have been absolutely foolproof.
All ﬁndings of mens rea ultimately lack the sub-nano psychometric calibra-
tion on the basis of which sentencing can be considered perfectly and
appropriately. No conviction and sentence can claim to assess the singular
otherness of the accused, that is, the unfathomable secret of the accused’s
mind. This being so, all ‘approximately just’ systems of criminal procedure
should assess themselves in terms of a justifiable pragmatic injustice, a justifiable
pragmatic injustice that must remain exposed to the possibility of continuous
revision and justiﬁcation, a justifiable pragmatic injustice that must itself remain
an upheaval with no conclusive name and no conclusive shape.59 Capital
punishment obviously does not allow for this and thus does not even comply
with the modest demands of an approximate justice. Jurisdictions that avail
themselves of capital punishment thus inevitably end up wallowing in glaring
injustice. The only escape from the glaring injustice of such jurisdictions
turns on the institution of clemency. The only way that judges in such
jurisdictions can retreat from a death sentence after a ﬁnding of ﬁrst-degree
murder is to offer the convict clemency. Clemency or mercy thus becomes
the only way out of the epistemological hubris that forged a link between the
mind of the accused and the circumstantial evidence of her conduct.60
The role of mercy in the administration of criminal justice should
therefore be clear. It is an expression of a narrative respect for the
unfathomable otherness of the accused. But the scope of the narrative
demands of grace, mercy and equity upon the law is surely not restricted to
criminal law. And it is not surprising that a penal system that not so long ago
availed itself of capital punishment also turned out to be unforgiving in its
private-law jurisprudence. It is not surprising that its private-law jurispru-
dence would turn out to know the secrets of others in most minute detail,
even when it paid lip service to the fact that it does not. A brief look at what
must count as one of the saddest moments in the apartheid history of the
SouthAfrican law of delict surely underlines this.
58 The weakness of the infallibility and other abolitionist arguments is pointed out
in Jacques Derrida & Elizabeth Roudinesco De quoi demain . . . Dialogue (2001) 225–
51. Cf also the discussion of these arguments in Van der Walt Law and Sacrifice op cit
note 41 at 107–8.
59 On this notion of justifiable pragmatic injustices, cf further Johan van der Walt &
Henk Botha ‘Democracy and rights in South Africa: Beyond a constitutional culture
of justiﬁcation’ (2000) 7 Constellations 341; Johan van der Walt ‘Rawls & Derrida on
the historicity of constitutional democracy and international justice’ (2009) 16 Con-
stellations 22.
60 SeeNussbaum ‘Equity andmercy’op cit note 11 at 145.
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(b) Mercy in private law
The central aim of the law of delict is the assessment of an amount of
compensation that must be paid to a person to whom damage has been
caused in a wrongful and culpable manner. In the case of patrimonial loss thus
caused, the amount of compensation that the court must award to wronged
persons must be calculated to put them in the patrimonial position in which
they were before the damage was caused. This approach to the assessment of
damages is generally known as the concrete approach. The courts simply
assess the negative difference between the claimant’s patrimonial position
before and after the damage-causing event and take this as the loss that must
be compensated. Courts sometimes also take recourse to a more hypothetical
approach. In terms of this approach the court takes the negative damage
between the actual patrimonial position of the claimant and the patrimonial
position in which the claimant would have been had the damage-causing
event not occurred.61 South African courts usually resort to the ﬁrst-
mentioned concrete approach. However, in cases where future damages
must be assessed, the courts invariably follow the latter, more speculative
approach. The very nature of future damages, especially future loss of
income, involves the court in speculations regarding the hypothetical
earning capacity the claimant would have had, had the damage-causing event
not occurred. In the past, motor vehicle accidents that left victims incapaci-
tated and unable to work required courts regularly to speculate in this way
about the loss of future income caused by the accident.
Apart from the component of future loss of income, courts also often have
to determine amounts of compensation for pain and suffering and lost
amenities of life caused by wrongful and culpable conduct. It should be
obvious that courts ﬁnd themselves on thin ice as far as the assessment of both
loss of future income (or earning capacity) and compensation for pain and
suffering and lost amenities of life is concerned. They are consequently not
averse to concede lack of conclusive knowledge and accuracy with regards to
these assessments. Consider the following dictum of Judge Nicholas:
‘Any inquiry into damages for loss of earning capacity is of its nature
speculative, because it involves a prediction as to the future, without the beneﬁt
of crystal balls, soothsayers, augurs or oracles. All that the court can do is to
make an estimate, which is often a very rough estimate, of the present value of
loss.’62
That this concession is often a matter of mere lip service and not an
61 These two approaches to the assessment of damage are respectively called the
‘concrete approach’ and the ‘sum-formula approach’. Cf Johann Neethling et al Law
of Delict 5 ed (2005) 205; J C van der Walt & J R Midgley Delict: Principles and Cases 2
ed (1997) 31–2.
62 Southern Insurance Association v Bailey NO 1984 (1) SA 98 (A) at 113G. The
discussion of the case that follows copies liberally from my earlier discussion of the
case in ‘The language of jurisprudence from Hobbes to Derrida (the latter’s quest for
an impossible poem)’1998 Acta Juridica 61.
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indication of true epistemological modesty is clear from the very case in
which it was made, namely, the South African Appellate Division’s assess-
ment of Danderine Bailey’s claim for damages against Southern Insurance
Association in the mid-eighties of the previous century. This sounds so long
ago, but it really is not. The shadow of this case still hangs over the South
African legal system and it just gets longer as the time passes.63
Danderine Bailey was run over by a motor vehicle on the 26th of
December 1978. She was two years’ old at the time of the accident. The case
report relates what came to pass immediately after the accident as follows:
‘She immediately became unconscious. While lying at the side of the road
before the ambulance arrived, she had an epileptic seizure. She was taken to
hospital and treated in an intensive care unit until 5 February 1979. It was only
on 29 January that she regained consciousness. Her progress was slow and it was
not until October 1979 that she could leave hospital and go home.’64
In his ﬁnal report of 18 December 1981 Professor Rose-Innes, the
neurosurgeon who examined her and testiﬁed in the trial court, articulated
the following ﬁndings:
‘The functional defects that have resulted from this brain injury remain, in
summary, very severe intellectual and emotional retardation, and an inability to
control her bladder and bowel functions; further there remains generalised
clumsiness and spasticity of limb movements more marked on the left side with
residual weakness here as well which may be attributed to injury to the cerebral
hemispheres and possibly also in part at brain stem level; the injury to the right
third cranial nerve resulting in the right eye tending to squint outwards slightly
and for the pupil to be enlarged and unresponsive to light, remains as before and
this injury is located either in the nerve itself or in the brain stem.’65
In the conclusion of his report Professor Rose-Innes also observed that her
condition had essentially remained unchanged since his previous report.66 A
paragraph of that report brought the following observations to light:
‘Further it should be noted that, in my opinion, she will have sufﬁcient insight
into her condition as she develops in future, so that she will be aware of her
physical and mental disabilities by comparison with normal people, so that this
will be a permanent source of painful frustration and suffering to her.’67
Danderine’s father had ﬁled a claim for damages in the then Cape
Provincial Division against the insurer of the vehicle with which she was run
over wrongfully and culpably. The insurer, Southern Insurance Association,
63 And those who read on beyond this point may well want to note again T S
Eliot’s ominous invitation in The Waste Land: ‘Come in under the shadow of this red
rock [where the dead tree gives no shelter],/And I will show you something different
[from all the shadows you have known and will know]./I will show you fear in a
handful of dust.’Quoted and partly paraphrased from T S Eliot Collected Poems 1909–
1962 (1963) 63–4.
64 Southern Insurance Association v Bailey supra note 62 at 107H–108A.
65 Ibid at 110B–D.
66 Ibid at 110G.
67 Ibid at 111B–C.
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initially denied all liability, but later accepted liability and only disputed the
amounts of compensation to be paid. In the end, the trial court awarded an
amount of R68 696 for loss of future income on the basis of an actuarial
calculation and an amount of R50 000 for lost amenities of life. It is for
reviewing the assessment of these two amounts that Southern Insurance then
appealed to theAppellate Division.68
Chief Justice Rabie and the Judges of Appeal Wessels, Corbett and
Hoexter all concurred with the decision of Judge of Appeal Nicholas that
both amounts should be reduced; the amount of R68 696 for future loss to
R58 000 and the amount of R50 000 for lost amenities of life to R35 000.
They consequently upheld the appeal with costs.69 The order for costs of
course meant that several thousand rand more were skimmed off the
compensation awarded to Danderine Bailey in order to pay the advocates
and attorneys of Southern Insurance.
The ﬁrst question which this decision raises does not concern its
correctness. The way the supplementary order for costs already distorts
signiﬁcantly whatever ‘correctness’ may have been at issue, renders this
question meaningless. The ﬁrst question that strikes one about this unani-
mous judgment concerns the nerve and conviction that moved the judges to
visit the details of this dispute a second time. The question concerns the
epistemological conviction that there was something that could be assessed
here with sufﬁcient precision to render the trial court assessment of damages
incorrect enough to uphold an appeal against it. Sustaining appeals against
trial court decisions is something appeal courts only do when they have
substantial grounds to do so.
But further questions follow immediately. How is it possible that ﬁve
judges of appeal could agree so unanimously regarding the precise amend-
ment of the amounts of compensation at issue? Was this unanimity not
perhaps motivated by the realisation that any difference of opinion regarding
the assessment of the compensation to be paid would only reveal the
irredeemable impossibility of any correctness under the circumstances, thus
rendering the amendment of the trial court assessment highly dubious?
And just how did the judges attain their unanimous assessment of the lesser
extent of Danderine Bailey’s loss?
Nicholas JA provides no meaningful information as regards the reduction
of compensation for lost amenities of life from R50 000 to R35 000. He
simply regarded it to be fair and equitable that the amount be reduced thus.
The case report nevertheless provides the following information regarding
the reduction of future loss of income from R68 696 to R50 000. The initial
amount of R68 696 was determined by ﬁrst calculating the total sum of
future loss of income and then reducing it by 10 per cent to make provision
for contingencies. Courts consider such contingency deductions in order to
68 As it was known then. Today it is the SupremeCourt ofAppeal.
69 Southern Insurance Association v Bailey supra note 62 at 121A–C.
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take into account the fact that claimants would not only have received
beneﬁts in the course of their future lives. They would also have been
exposed to possible misfortune that would have affected their expected
income negatively.
Counsel for Southern Insurance argued that the 10 per cent contingency
deduction was much too low. Danderine was after all still small. For the
whole duration of her life she would have been exposed to a broad spectrum
of possible misfortune. Stated brutally: The accident that hit her now could
quite possibly have hit her some years later. Thus did Southern Insurance
argue that the trial court should have allowed a contingency deduction of
50 per cent. The court’s response to this argument was that life is not just
exposed to the risk of misfortune, but also to the possibility of unexpected
beneﬁts. But in the end the court did raise the contingency deduction from
10 to 25 per cent and thus reduced the trial court’s assessment of the loss of
future income from R68 696 to R50 000. Why so, could one ask with
considerable justiﬁcation? After all, once one has assumed that the degree of
contingency of future fortune and misfortune is more or less the same, an
assumption that is surely not excessively rosy, one really has no ground for
making any contingency deduction whatsoever.70
But until now, we have not at all looked at how the trial court determined
the initial amount of R76 328 which it then reduced to R68 696 with the
contingency deduction of 10 per cent. For purposes of calculating Dan-
derine Bailey’s future loss of income, the court took her mother’s income as
its point of departure. Danderine Bailey’s mother worked as an apple grader
on an apple farm in the Southern Cape. She earned R36 a week for grading
the quality of the apples that the farm supplied to the market. Danderine
Bailey’s loss of future income was calculated by taking this amount and
multiplying it by the number of weeks she would have worked in the course
of her lifetime. By calculating her future income in this fashion, the court
reconciled itself to reducing her life chances to the typical fate of ‘non-
whites’ subject to the apartheid labour market of the 1980s. The judges
realistically left her to the unforgiving fate of an apartheid economy that
would surely not grant her any aspirations that would exceed the modest
expectations of her mother. And one should probably commend them for at
least not accepting the argument of counsel for Southern Insurance that it
was not certain at all that she would get as good a job as that of her mother.
That this apartheid labour economy and the whole apartheid system
70 As Mervyn Dendy ‘The law of delict’ 1984 Annual Survey of South African Law
233–4 observed: ‘But then the court went on to increase the trial court’s deduction of
10 per cent for contingencies to 25 per cent. Sed Quaere? One would have thought
from the above remarks [that it is erroneous to regard the fortunes of life as being
always adverse] that Nicholas JAwould criticise the trial court for making a deduction
at all rather than actually increase the percentage deducted.’ Indeed, if it is assumed
that there is an equal chance of losing and gaining in the course of life, one has no
ground onwhich a deduction for contingencies can be based.
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would be dismantled ten years later was something they could not contem-
plate in their juridical and actuarial calculations. That Danderine Bailey may
well have had education opportunities on the basis of which she could have
become anything from a farm worker to a secretary to a medical doctor,
advocate or chartered accountant, and that they may have calculated a more
realistic average expectation on the basis of this broader spectrum of
professional possibilities, were things they could not count on juridically in
the mid-eighties. That she may have had natural talent that could have
catapulted her out of her modest background irrespective of a lack of
educational opportunities — that she may have become a beloved actress,
dancer, singer or model — they of course could have contemplated even less.
Whatever kind of narrative the law aspires to be, it is surely not a ‘from rags to
riches’ fairy tale. Juridically the judges felt compelled, perhaps quite ‘cor-
rectly’ so, to equate her life chances with those of her mother, with those of a
farm worker caught up in an unforgiving racist economy. The law compared
and equated her with someone whom she was not. It was not her unique life
chances that the court sought to assess in order to determine her loss. The
court brutally imposed on her the already brutally imposed life chances of
another. One cannot imagine a legal system ever to exemplify more harshly
the irrational rationality that Adorno and Marx impute to law in their
respective reﬂections in Negative Dialektik and The Gotha Programme.
It should nevertheless be clear that one cannot fault the judges juridically for
their strictly legal assessment of Danderine Bailey’s life chances. To make a
different assessment they would have had to imagine the end of apartheid in
an almost ﬁctional manner, something that was hardly possible amidst the still
prevailing hell of the 1980s. They would have had to contemplate, by grace
of a truly epic sensitivity, the possibility that that hell had to end one day. Or,
lacking any epic or literary hope regarding the end of apartheid, they would
have had to fantasise about the fairy-tale escape of a dancer or actress or singer
from the harsh realities of her childhood. In short, they would have had to
resort in some way or another to the mercy that Nussbaum links to the
literary sensibility. The strictly juridical paradigm of the law offered them no
such recourse at the time.
One critical observation must nevertheless be made with regard to this
unforgiving legalism. Many legal theorists argued during and after the
apartheid era that the substance of South African law was never tarnished by
the stain of apartheid. This stain was conﬁned to apartheid politics and the
statutory law that resulted from this politics. The proud tradition of
Roman-Dutch law, especially Roman-Dutch private law, the law of con-
tract, delict, insurance, and so forth, never took part in the hell of apartheid
SouthAfrica, averred these theorists.71Again, one cannot blame the judges in
71 For the now classic statement of the critique of this mentality, cf André van der
Walt ‘Tradition on trial: A critical analysis of the civil-law tradition in South African
property law’ (1995) 11 SAJHR 169. Cf in this regard also his more recent ‘Legal
history, legal culture and transformation in a constitutional democracy’ (2006) 12
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the Bailey case juridically for their strictly juridical mentalities. But the story or
narrative of Danderine Bailey does place an enormous question mark behind
the political innocence of SouthAfrica’s proud Roman-Dutch tradition. Yet,
more is at stake here.Any literary narrative or story that would seek to register
the singularity of Danderine Bailey’s life, the life of a two-year-old girl who
was run down on the 26th of December 1978, lost her consciousness,
suffered an epileptic ﬁt while still lying on the pavement, came to only weeks
later with serious brain injuries, uncontrollable bodily spasms and an eye
staring blindly into empty space, and who was eventually doomed, by
demand of an insurance company and by order of a court, in ﬁnest detail to
the racist economy into which she was born, surely requires that one
maintains a ﬁrm distinction between law and literature.
VI AGAAT AND THE STORY OF POST-APARTHEID LAW
Agaat clearly constitutes a pertinent critique of the imaginary world of
apartheid law, the law that so easily assumed that the life chances of one
individual were equal to those of another, not only because they were
workers, as Marx taught us, but also because they were black or coloured
workers or born into a family of such workers, as Bram Fischer understood so
selﬂessly. The Bailey case confronts one with an imaginary world, a world in
which the unique otherness and living secret of one individual is displaced by
the mirror image of another, a mirror image that derives in turn from the
spectacular totality or total spectacle of mirroring effects produced by the
speculation of apartheid capitalism.
One need not only refer to Bataille and Derrida72 to trace the etymological
link between mirroring and speculation embodied in the Latin speculum.
Calvino’s If on a Winter’s Night a Traveller also makes this link clear in a
shattering parody of the endless play of mirroring in the human mind.73
Fundamina 1. Cf further his arguments regarding the constitutional review of consti-
tutionally unsound remnants of apartheid private law in the South African legal sys-
tem in ‘Transformative constitutionalism and the development of South African
property law’2005 TSAR 655, 2006 TSAR 1.
72 Cf Derrida L’Écriture et La Différence op cit note 13 at 369–407.
73 Cf Calvino If on a Winter’s Night a Traveller op cit note 36 at 161–8: ‘Speculate,
reﬂect: every thinking activity implies mirrors for me.According to Plotinus, the soul
is a mirror that creates material things reﬂecting the ideas of the higher reason. Maybe
this is why I need mirrors to think: I cannot concentrate except in the presence of
reﬂected images, as if my soul needed a model to imitate every time it wanted to
employ its speculative capacity. (The adjective here assumes all its meanings: I am at
once a man who thinks and a businessman, and a collector of optical instruments as
well.) . . . For this reason, if I were not afraid of being misunderstood, I would have
nothing against reconstructing, in my house, the room completely lined with mirrors
according to Kircher’s design, in which I would see myself walking on the ceiling,
head down, as if I were ﬂying upward from the depths of the ﬂoor. . . . These pages I
amwriting should also transmit a cold luminosity, as in a mirrored tube, where a ﬁnite
number of ﬁgures are broken up and turned upside down and multiplied. If my ﬁgure
sets out in all directions and is doubled at every corner, it is to discourage those who
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This endless mirroring can be described in terms of the shallow reﬂections
of wishful or wish-fulﬁlling imagery that prevents the self from ever engaging
with the real otherness of the other or the real otherness of the self. The
otherness of the other and the irreducible otherness of the self as other thus
get lost in an inﬁnite hall of superﬁcial mirroring. The English language
suggests two things about beauty. Beauty is but skin deep and beauty is in the
eye of the beholder. The ﬁrst suggestion intimates that beauty is as shallow as
skin. But we have learned from Jean-Luc Nancy’s exquisite ex-peau-sitioning
thought that the skin is not shallow. It is only a certain beholding of skin that
is shallow, an imaginary beholding.74 The essence of apartheid lay and lies in
such a shallow beholding, a beholding that turned on a superﬁcial regard for
others on the basis of an outer pigmentation of skin, a superﬁcial regard on
the basis of which a whole world of mirrors could be imagined, a world of
white governments, white judiciaries, industrious white factory owners,
crafty white businessmen, on the one hand, and black workers, black
servants, unemployed blacks, lazy blacks, stupid blacks, etc, on the other.
Stark, ﬁxed, repetitive and unforgiving was apartheid’s endless hall of
mirrors. The assessment of Danderine Bailey’s life chances in the Bailey case
was nothing but another brutal ﬂash in this self-mirroring of apartheid.
That the underlying apartheid of a perpetual imaging of workers, on the
one hand, and factory, farm and other property owners, on the other, still
prevails in South Africa more than ten years after the end of statutory and
institutional racial discrimination, needs little contention. The years of
statutory and institutional racism in SouthAfrica were, from this perspective,
a cruel black and white caricature of the divisive apartheid logic that still
prevails in South Africa (in many respects, moreover, still rather black and
white), but also elsewhere in the capitalist economies of the world. The rise
want to pursue me. I am a man of many enemies, whom I must constantly elude.
When they think they have overtaken me, they will strike only a glass surface on
which one of the many reﬂections of my ubiquitous presence appears and vanishes.
. . . Ever since it became clear to me that my kidnapping would be the exploit most
desired not only by the various bands of specialist crooks but also by my leading
colleagues and rivals in the world of high ﬁnance, I have realized that only by multi-
plying myself, multiplying my person, my presence, my exits from the house, and my
returns, in short the opportunities for an ambush, could I make my falling into enemy
hands more improbable. So I then ordered ﬁve Mercedes sedans exactly like mine,
which enter and leave the armoured gate of my villa at all hours, escorted by the
motorcyclists of my bodyguard, and bearing inside a shadow, bundled up, dressed in
black, who could be me or an ordinary stand-in. . . . But I had not taken into consid-
eration [the concomitant multiplication of my enemies] and a third kidnapping plan
arranged by persons unknown. By whom? . . . Tomy surprise, instead of takingme to
a secret hideaway, my kidnappers accompany me to my house, lock me in the catop-
tric room I had designed with such care from the designs of Athanasius Kircher. The
mirror walls reﬂect on my image an inﬁnite number of times. Had I been kidnapped
bymyself? Had one of my images cast into the world takenmy place and relegated me
to the role of reﬂected image? Had I summoned the Prince of Darkness and was he
appearing tome inmy own likeness?’
74 For these thoughts, cf Nancy Corpus (2000).
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of freedom of contract and alienable property, the cornerstones of modern
and post-modern law, embodied an emancipatory promise in early modern
law. It embodied the promise of a free and varying exchange of social status
that would replace the ﬁxed states or estates of feudal society with a free and
open society. Anyone not easily duped by spectacular and speculating
illusions knows how little came of this emancipatory promise. As long as
social immobility remains a fundamental characteristic of capitalist econo-
mies, the capital-serving and capital-increasing speculation of legal reasoning
that marks the Bailey case will keep the poor mercilessly ‘in their place’. The
Constitutional Court’s decision in the Grootboom case75 was hailed as a
progressive breakthrough in the socio-economic jurisprudence of South
Africa. One must, however, not forget that it ultimately did little more than
overturn the truly progressive judgment of a courageous trial judge.76 It did
not afford Irene Grootboom the house she claimed was her due in terms of
s 26 of the Constitution of SouthAfrica. Irene Grootboom died at the age of
39 on 30 July 2008, still without a reasonably windproof and rainproof
dwelling.77 She still lived in a makeshift shack in Wallacedene as she did
shortly before she approached the court in 2000. As long as this merciless
capitalist logic prevails even in ‘progressive’ judicial decisions, the merciful
escape from it advocated by Nussbaum will have to rely on a literary
sensibility that undertakes the symbolic and communicative task of exploring
75 Government of the Republic of South Africa; The Premier of the Province of the Western
Cape; Cape Metropolitan Council; Oostenberg Municipality v Irene Grootboom & others
(2000) 11 BCLR 1169 (CC).
76 Section 26(1) of the South African Constitution states that everyone in South
Africa has the right to adequate housing. It does not state that this right is subject to
available resources. Following Aquinas (cf Summa Theologiae vol 38 (1975) 2a 2ae 66
7) one could say s 26(1) simply requires that we take resources from those who have a
surplus and use it to provide housing to those in need of it. Yet, in the case of
Government of the Republic of South Africa & others v Grootboom & others, the Constitu-
tional Court again subjected the right in s 26(1) to the provision in s 26(2) that
stipulates the state’s duties vis-à-vis the right in s 26(1). The rather absolute statement
that ‘[e]veryone has the right to access to adequate housing’ thus came to be read to
say that everyone has a right that the state ‘take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realization of this
right.’ In Grootboom the Constitutional Court went so far as to state that a housing
scheme that does not provide for immediate relief in desperate cases (the Grootboom
case was a desperate one) cannot be said to be reasonable. The court nevertheless did
not order the government to provide the relief needed so desperately. It in fact
explicitly overturned Judge Davis’ courageous trial court decision that had indeed
ordered the government to provide the relief required. Cf Grootboom para 95: ‘Nei-
ther s 26 nor s 28 entitles the respondents to claim shelter or housing immediately
upon demand. TheHighCourt order ought therefore not to have beenmade.’
77 Cf Francis Hweshe ‘Heroine dies while still waiting’ The Argus 4 August 2008,
also available at www.abahlali.org/node/3860. She spoke to The Argus two days before
her death and observed: ‘When it rains, water seeps through every crevice. I try to
repair but I cannot do much. I was supposed to get a house but I am still in a shack
with my sister-in-law and her three children. They keep promising us. I am sick and
tired of the whole thing.’
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the unique, fragile and mortal otherness between selves and others in a much
more revolutionary way than she appears to be contemplating.
It is in literature that the juridical may come to discern the signs of a free
libidinal economy, the signs of a non-possessive and non-judgmental sensual
exchange with others that always gets repressed in the property and
propriety-based economies of bourgeois capitalism. This repression is also
central in the sad narrative of Milla de Wet’s life. Her mixed farming and ﬁne
knowledge of the soil and the principles of soil preservation are surely not
comparable to the rapacious extraction of spectacular force-fertilised harvests
with which Jak de Wet turns potentially fertile stretches of land into
devastated deserts. But she too represses the promise of a sensual exchange
with things and people for the sake of a bourgeois image of successful farming
and an exemplary family farm. It is for the sake of this image that she persists
with a loveless and abusive marriage, the lack of love and abusiveness of
which ultimately permeate and determine her relation withAgaat. The novel
Agaat portrays Milla as someone who is split or torn between a loving and
sensual openness to things and people and the loveless repression of this
openness. With this narrative of a person split between a repressive economy
of ﬁxed or closed images and a libidinal, sensual and loving concern with
others, Agaat intimates traces of a radically different economy. This economy,
however, is never consummated, never takes shape, remains unnamed to the
end.
That the unique characteristics and differences between individuals could
give rise to a free exchange of social roles and positions is not thinkable in the
imaginary worlds of apartheid. That the living secret of each individual could
give rise to ever-changing and therefore inﬁnitely ﬁner, inﬁnitely more
differentiated and therefore inﬁnitely more interesting narratives of human
co-existence could not be imagined. It could not be imagined because
worlds of inﬁnite change and inﬁnite variations can never be imagined. They
can never be pictured. They can only be read on a day to day basis, for they
always come as a surprise. The story of post-apartheid South Africa will
therefore always remain to be read. One can only prepare for this reading, but
the reading itself will remain a surprise.78
Such reading offers us the only chance of human co-existence. Not only
was apartheid a case of a mirroring imagination. Mirroring imaginings are the
essence of all apartheids, the essence of all worlds in which individuals never
meet, never reach the threshold of otherness. Calvino’s ingenious parody of
the author who built a wall of mirrors to protect himself from kidnappers
narrates this thought masterfully. In the end the author realises that he has all
along been imprisoning himself without the aid of kidnappers.79 Very close to
her death, Milla de Wet realises that she was all along a prisoner of her own
projections of Agaat. Only in the face of death and through the real
78 CfVan derWalt Law and Sacrifice op cit note 41 at 234.
79 Cf note 70 supra.
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contemplation of her own death, of her self as indeed dead, does she realise
that she never knew Agaat. Only then, when she imagines Agaat alone on
Grootmoedersdrift after the burial, after all the guests had left and Jakkie had
also left for Canada, only then does it become possible for her to sense the
secret of Agaat’s otherness on which she has brutally imposed herself and her
view of things. And for the ﬁrst time she experiences a sensual closeness to
Agaat. Here too imagination and the imagery of the past are rife, but it is
fragile and mortal now. It begins to give way to sheer language, to poetry.
I see her standing at the gate when the last guests have left, when Jakkie’s gone back to
Canada. The gate will hold her, its silver inner cross, the tensed wires and the pipes of
which it’s constructed.
She won’t be able to turn back immediately.
She’ll feel the clasp with the fingertips of the little hand, even though she knows it’s in
place, feel the black iron ring, the double iron ring, the double wire hook over which it
slides. Her other hand, the strong one, will enclose the upper pipe, let go and grasp again
so that the knuckles show white.
It won’t be the first time. So she stood every day when Jakkie went to school by bus,
and every time after that when he went away after weekends or holidays. Then I had to go
and fetch her there, or call her back from the stoep.
She will stand there and nobody will call her.
The dogs will sniff at her hems. They will press their wet muzzles into the back of her
legs. Jump up against her so that she’d be thrown slightly off balance.
The gate of Grootmoedersdrift.
Gate of Agaat’s world.
She’ll lift the black iron ring off the hook and let it drop back.
The gate is closed, the road is white, its way is back and forward. And even further back
to its unfindable starting point like all ways. Through the unknown, remembered gate,
when the last of earth left to discover is that which was the beginning.
Oh, my little Agaat, my child that I pushed away from me, my child that I forsook
after I’d appropriated her, that I caught without capturing her, that I locked up before I’d
unlocked her!
Why did I not keep you as I found you? What made me abduct you over the pass?
What made me steal you from beyond the rugged mountains? Why can I only now be
with you like this, in a fantasy of my own death?
Why only now love you with this inexpressible regret?
And how must I let you know this?
See, in the twilight I lead a cow before you, a gentle Jersey cow, the colour of caramel,
the colour of burnt sugar, she smells of straw and a cud of lucerne. I place your hands on her
nose, your palm on her lips. You are the eye reader. There it is, bucketfuls of mercy in
those defenceless pupils.80
– emmers vol genade in daardie weerlose pupille.81
In this fantasy of her own death Milla at long last ﬁnds the grace and mercy
to understand the terrifying loneliness of Agaat’s whole life, a loneliness that
does not start with Milla’s death, but with Milla’s discovery of Agaat in the
80 Selectively quoted from Van Niekerk Agaat (2006) op cit note 21 at 538–40,
original text inRoman font.
81 VanNiekerk Agaat (2004) op cit note 21 at 560, original text inRoman font.
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hearth on the other side of the Skurweberge, the life-long loneliness of
empty mirror images that Milla imposed on Agaat. It is, however, not only
Agaat that is set free by this mercy. The bucketfuls of mercy that Milla
receives in this fantasy of her own death also rid her of the imagery that kept
her imprisoned in herself. Faced with her own death, she can really be with
someone, with Agaat. Why can I only now be with you like this, in a fantasy of my
own death? For a rare moment she experiences a togetherness of two that
matters.82
For the ﬁrst time Milla is able to accompany Agaat, not with the cold and
formalistic images of the Hulpboek vir Boere in Suid-Afrika, but with the
earthly warmth and vulnerable sensuality of a Jersey cow. This is surely one of
the tenderest, most touching and most upsetting moments of the novel. If
bucketfuls of mercy were to be introduced into Dworkin’s chain novel, one
could take a cue from this passage in Agaat. Perhaps one could venture as far
as to graft, in un-Dworkinian fashion, the narrative of Agaat onto the
narrative of the law, even if only to redeem for a ﬁctional moment the history
of the South African law of delict in the time of apartheid. One could follow
Dworkin in one respect though. One could write Agaat further as if it were a
chain novel (surely rushing in like a fool where angels should fear to tread),
for in fact, that is what it also is, a chain novel that leads back, among others,
to T S Eliot and through Eliot to Dante. The gate of Grootmoedersdrift at
which Milla envisages Agaat standing after her burial is taken from the last
stanza of Little Gidding.83 The last lines of the stanza invoke a wellness of
82 Cf Johan van der Walt ‘The impossibility of two together when it matters’ 2002
TSAR 462. The ‘togetherness of two that matters’ that is invoked here must be
understood duly in view of the caution expressed in note 24 supra. The togetherness
that matters is not one of having found the other, but the togetherness indirectly
afforded by the excruciatingly regretful insight, in the face of imminent death, not
only of never having found the other during life, but also of not even having
approached the limits of one’s imagery regarding the other and thus not even having
reached the threshold where an experience with the other’s difference could have
commenced. The togetherness at issue here does not suspend its irreducible impossi-
bility, for it becomes possible only through an experience of death and mortality. In a
previous draft of this essay I suggested that this was the ﬁrst such experience in Milla’s
life. I am indebted to Melodie Slabbert’s insightful essay ‘Justice, justiﬁcation and
justiﬁability in Marlene Van Niekerk’s Agaat: A legal-literary exploration’ (2006) 12
Fundamina 236 at 243n39 for pointing out an earlier such close-to-death experience
during which Milla also experienced a certain togetherness with Agaat, namely, dur-
ing the birth of her son on the mountain pass. But here too, as Slabbert also points out
well, the truth of this momentary and mortal togetherness only lasts to the extent that
it reveals its own absence; to the extent that it brieﬂy informs an awareness that the
‘togetherness’ with Agaat is/was predominantly an empty or false togetherness based
on the re-making of Agaat in Milla’s image (of Agaat and of herself). At issue here is
not really a relation between two, Milla and Agaat, but a relation between Milla and
her own projection and re-making ofAgaat.
83 Cf Eliot Collected Poems op cit note 63 at 222: ‘We shall not cease from
exploration/And the end of all our exploring/Will be to arrive where we started/And
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things and of the manner of things, a wellness that turns on the uniﬁcation of
ﬁre and the rose in Dante’s Paradise.84
Come. Let us follow Dworkin in this un-Dworkinian fashion. Let us
return to the gate of Grootmoedersdrift, and the gate of Little Gidding, and
open them for the arrival of another one who would speak to Agaat with
tapping eyelids. Let us turn Agaat into a narrative of purgatorial ﬁres, a
narrative without which nothing will be redeemed and no manner of thing
shall be well, a narrative without which the story of post-apartheid law will
remain nothing but a legal ﬁction. Let us turn the law into a story of sacer
facere in which sacriﬁce will not be denied yet again.85
She stood there at the gate. Nobody called for her. She lifted the black iron ring of the hook
and let it drop back.
The gate was closed, the road was white, its way leads back and forward. And even
further back to its unfindable starting point like all ways. Through the unknown,
remembered gate, when the last of earth left to discover is that which was the beginning.86
But even further back, from behind its unﬁndable starting point, a minute
black spot appeared on the white dirt road. It became bigger; came closer.
And then she was there. The brown woman in her mid-thirties, with one
eye staring blankly into space, with her legs and arms jerking with every
movement she made, and one eyelid that winks and blinks wildly; wink-
wink, blink wink-wink-wink, wink. . . . And further, just incomprehensible
groaning and moaning.
‘But woman, are you spelling something with that wild eye? Not so fast, I
can’t keep up. Milla did not prepare me for this.’
But still the ﬂurry of winks continued: Y.o.u. . a.r.e. . A.g.a.a.t.. w.h.o.
r.e.a.d.s. e.y.e. . l.a.n.g.u.a.g.e., graspedAgaat.
What is your name, she asked the woman and repeated after another salvo
of winking and blinking:
‘D-a-n-c-e-r-i-n-e.’
The woman shook her head wildly, her urgent face nevertheless evincing a
faint smile. It took time, but in the end, Agaat understood. There was an
accident many years ago after which she never spoke again. There were some
efforts to teach her to write, but her spasticity always interfered and after a
while everyone gave up. The gifted section of her brain that remained
know the place for the ﬁrst time./Through the unknown, remembered gate/When
the last of earth left to discover/Is that whichwas the beginning[.]’
84 Cf Eliot Collected Poems op cit note 63 at at 223: ‘And all shall be well and/All
manner of thing shall be well/When the tongues of ﬂame are in-folded/Into the
crowned knot of ﬁre/And the ﬁre and the rose are one.’ Cf also Dante Alighieri The
Divine Comedy, Paradise, CantoXXVIII, 73–96.
85 Little Gidding still: ‘Water and ﬁre succeed/The town, the pasture and the
weed./Water and ﬁre deride/The sacriﬁce that we denied./Water and ﬁre shall rot/
The marred foundations we forgot . . .’. Cf Eliot Collected Poems op cit note 63 at at
216. This refusal to forget and deny sacriﬁce will of course have to turn on a critical
regard for the irreducible link between purgatory and paradise.
86 Cf again note 80.
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functioning nevertheless refused to give up. It found a detour to her living
eye and eyelid and she started writing like a hurricane compelled to express a
lifetime of meaning in one spiraling eruption. But still no one understood.
‘T.h.e..b.l.o.o.d.y.. i.d.i.o.t.s. . .a.r.o.u.n.d..m.e d.o n.o.t k.n.o.w. h.o.w.
c.l.e.v.e.r. I. s.t.i.l.l. a.m’, grasped Agaat after some more blinking. No one
understood. And then she heard of Marlene van Niekerk’s novel Agaat and
wondered whether there was any truth in the story. She went looking for
Grootmoedersdrift and here she is now. ‘Danderine’ is her name, but the
‘Dancerine’ is actually very ﬁtting for people deridingly started calling her
‘Ballerina’ because of her spasticity.
‘Good, Danderine or Dancerine, let us go and wash and eat something —
there is a lot of food left from a burial we had here today. And then we might
even dance a little tonight.’
After their meal they made ﬁres, in the middle of the rooms and in the
passages of the old farmhouse like veritable Mau Mau. Agaat still had a
particular love for ﬁre. The whole house was alight like the library in The
Name of the Rose or the barn on the occasion of Jakkie’s big birthday
celebration. There was a lot of smoke. And in the glow of the ﬁre and the
smoke the two brown women danced; Danderine’s spasticity breathtakingly
sexual, her blind eye staring wildly away, beautiful like nocturnal insanity, her
skin the colour of a Jersey cow, the colour of caramel, the colour of burnt sugar.
AndAgaat also danced, danced with a new joyful urge breaking into or out
of her caramel ﬂesh, ﬂesh covered not with a stiff white uniform but a loose
white dress that simultaneously veiled and unveiled her body as she danced.
She danced the dance that Milla once saw her dancing on the mountain top
and again on the beach some time later:
Sideways & backwards knees bent foot-stamping jumping on one leg jump-jump &
point-point with one arm on the ground. Then the arms rigid next to the sides. Then she
folded them & then she stretched them. Looked as if she was keeping the one arm in the air
with the other arm & waving . . . Hr head in the air, looking up at her little arm as if it’s a
stick. Walking stick, fencing foil? Then again held still in front of hr, palm turned down
palm turned up. Judgement? Blessing? Over the hills over the valley along the river? A
farewell ritual turned into a gay dance of love?87
But Agaat did not only know how to start ﬁres. She also knew how to
extinguish them. So the old farmhouse of Grootmoedersdrift never burnt
down.88 Besides, there is no ﬁre that can burn down Grootmoedersdrift, just
87 Van Niekerk Agaat (2006) op cit note 21 at 150–1, Van Niekerk’s original text in
Roman font, italicised here byVan derWalt; last line inRoman font added byVan der
Walt.
88 The food left over from the funeral did not last, though. So they started cooking
again. Agaat’s old favourite, soet pampoen (sweet pumpkin) was still there, but now
especially enjoyed with the fried brains and insides of the little veld animals which
Danderine caught and killed so dexterously with her bare hands. Her spasticity, or
something in her, always just had the better of them.Agaat smiled when she saw this.
It reminded her of her galjoene. They should really go to the sea one day, she thought.
And whenever this happened close to a certain big old tree in the garden of the old
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like there is no ﬁre that can burn down the library in The Name of the Rose.
This is so because this house and this library were not built but written. With
every new reading of Agaat and of The Name of the Rose the library and the old
farmhouse will always ﬁrst be there again. And should this reading of Agaat
ever be read again, Agaat and Danderine Bailey will always again begin their
ﬁre dance on the polished ﬂoors of the old opstal.89 This is so because ﬁction,
to the extent that it is lasting, exposes us to a secret time zone, the time of the
perpetual event, the time of the perpetual upheaval that never has a name as
yet.90And so does the law, as a matter of fact, but it always does so in a state of
denial. For it is in the inevitable nature of law to conclude and give a name to
the event, except to the extent that it is sometimes interrupted by mercy.
Grimm meets Goth in the Overberg91 and a mysterious grace gathers like fog
around its towering cliffs. Agaat and Danderine Bailey are dancing the dance
of Macabré and I must stop. It is getting late and my story is all too obviously
an apocryphal falsiﬁcation of both law and literature.
opstal, they both had to look up in surprise and search the area around them. It was if
someone in or behind the tree had uttered a joyful little giggle. During the daysAgaat
also taught Danderine to read and write and speak as well as do some embroidery, just
like Milla had taught her many years ago. But the reading, writing and embroidery
were not concerned with ediﬁcation and exemplariness. It was just a way of giving
their hands something to do (which amazingly brought Danderine’s spastic hands to
rest during these quiet afternoons) while they chatted about all that came to mind as
they sat ﬂat on their behinds with their legs stretched out straight before them (as if
stiff hamstrings were a white man’s disease only) in one of the cool shades of Groot-
moedersdrift’s garden. As dit nie so snaaks geklink het nie sou mens kon sê dat hulle
hier ’n spesiﬁek vroulike gebied betree het. (If it did not sound so funny, one could
have said that they found themselves here in the domain of the speciﬁcally feminine.)
(Cf Betsie Verwoerd’s words quoted in the second epigraph to Agaat (2004/2006)
from Hetsie vanWyk’s Borduur Só [Embroider Like This] (1966).)And here too, during
these afternoons of endless conversation in the cool shades of Grootmoedersdrift,
especially when it was the shade of one speciﬁc big tree in which they sat, they
constantly had the impression that there was another woman with them, one that
sometimes even ventured an opinion on a point of discussion. They then laughingly
referred to themselves as the three witches of Grootmoedersdrift. ‘Hail Macbeth’,
they would shout with abandon, ‘thou shallt not be King’. ‘No man shall’. ‘But this
mysterious one with us shall become the shade that shelters the law of this land, as well
as the eternal shadow that hangs over it.’
89 It is fair to assume that it will have started to smell a little strooiserig after a while.
90 Does this not again point to an anti-revolutionary and apolitical acquiescence, a
resignation in the face of the status quo? No. The story may remain the same but its
future readings may well hold and precipitate surprises, for instance — who knows —
the real resurrection of Mau Mau practices in the proud old colonial homesteads of
the Cape. God forbid, but who knows. . . . (Surely, if it is part of the business of a
literary Marxism to decolonise, it has to contemplate hospitably the absolute freedom
of the colonised, the only available register of which is the coloniser’s most imagina-
tive or imaginary — take your pick — fears.And it along these lines that one can begin
to search for a certain resonance between Agaat and J M Coetzee’s Disgrace and thus
for a certainmercy, grace and graciousness in the latter.
91 VanNiekerk Agaat (2006) op cit note 21 at 692, (2004) op cit note 21 at 718.
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